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ABSTRACT
"Forecast targeting," forward-looking monetary policy that uses central-bank judgment to construct
optimal policy projections of the target variables and the instrument rate, may perform substantially
better than monetary policy that disregards judgment and follows a given instrument rule. This is
demonstrated in a few examples for two empirical models of the U.S. economy, one forward looking
and one backward looking. A complicated infinite-horizon central-bank projection model of the
economy can be closely approximated by a simple finite system of linear equations, which is easily
solved for the optimal policy projections. Optimal policy projections corresponding to the optimal
policy under commitment in a timeless perspective can easily be constructed. The whole projection
path of the instrument rate is more important than the current instrument setting. The resulting
reduced-form reaction function for the current instrument rate is a very complicated function of all
inputs in the monetary-policy decision process, including the central bank's judgment. It cannot be
summarized as a simple reaction function such as a Taylor rule. Fortunately, it need not be made
explicit.
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On a general level, this paper is motivated by a desire to provide a better theory of modern
monetary policy, both from a descriptive and a normative point of view, than much of the current
literature on monetary policy. The current literature to a large extent applies a one-line modeling
of monetary policy, such as when the instrument rate is assumed to be a given function of a few
variables, for instance, “monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor rule.”
I believe that the theory that I develop here is better from a descriptive point of view, since
it takes into account some crucial aspects of monetary-policy decisions, such as the collection,
processing, and analysis of large amounts of data, the construction of projections of the target
variables, the use of considerable amounts of judgment, and the desire to achieve (mostly) relatively
speciﬁc objectives. The modern monetary-policy process I have in mind can be concisely described
as “forecast targeting,” meaning “setting the instrument rate such that the forecasts of the target
variables look good,” where “look good” refers to the objectives of monetary policy, such as a given
target for inﬂation and a zero target for the output gap.1 I believe this view of the monetary-policy
process is also helpful from a normative point of view, for instance, in evaluating the performance
of and suggesting improvements to existing monetary policy.2
On a more speciﬁc level, this paper is motivated by a desire to demonstrate the crucial and
beneﬁcial role of judgment–information, knowledge, and views outside the scope of a particular
model–in modern monetary policy and, in particular, to demonstrate that the appropriate use
of good judgment can dramatically improve monetary-policy performance, even when compared
to policy that is optimal in all respects except for incorporating judgment.3 As will be explained
in detail below, judgment will be represented as the central-bank’s conditional mean estimate of
arbitrary multidimensional stochastic “deviations”–“add factors”–to the model equations.4 Ia l s o
1 Bernanke [3] discusses and compares forecast targeting (which he refers to as “forecast-based policies”) and
simple instrument rules (which he refers to as “simple feedback policies”). He states that “the Federal Reserve relies
primarily on the forecast-based approach for making policy” and cites Greenspan’s [9] speech, entitled “Risk and
Uncertainty in Monetary Policy,” as evidence. He also notes “that not only have most central banks chosen to rely
most heavily on forecast-based policies but also that the results, at least in recent years, have generally been quite
good, as most economies have enjoyed low inﬂation and overall economic stability.”
2 See Svensson [22] and Svensson, Houg, Solheim, and Steigum [28] for examples of evaluations of monetary policy
in New Zealand and Norway, respectively, with this perspective.
3 Svensson [25] also emphasizes the role of judgment in monetary policy but does not provide any direct comparision
of the performance of monetary policy with and without judgment.
4 Svensson and Tetlow [31] show how central-bank judgment can be extracted according to the method of Optimal
Policy Projections (OPP). This is a method to provide advice on optimal monetary policy while taking policymakers’
judgment into account. An early version of the method was developed by Robert Tetlow for a mostly backward-
looking variant of the Federal Reserve Board’s FRB/US model. The resulting projections have been referred to
at the Federal Reserve Board as “policymaker perfect-foresight projections”–somewhat misleadingly. The paper
demonstrates the usefulness of OPP with a few example projections for two Greenbook forecasts and the FRB/US
model.
1wish to demonstrate the beneﬁts of regarding the whole projection paths of the target variables
rather than forecasts at some speciﬁc horizon, such as 8 quarters, as the relevant objects in the
monetary-policy decision process. In particular, I believe that it is important to emphasize the whole
projection of future instrument rates rather than just the current instrument rate. Furthermore, the
modern view of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy emphasizes that monetary-policy
actions have eﬀects on the economy and the central bank’s target variables almost exclusively
through the private-sector expectations of the future paths of inﬂation, output, and interest rates
that these actions give rise to; therefore, monetary policy is really the management of private-sector
expectations (Woodford [35]). From this follows that eﬀective implementation of monetary policy
requires the eﬀective communication to the private sector of the central bank’s preferred projections,
including the instrument-rate projection. The most obvious communication of these projections
is to explicitly announce and motivate them. Finally, I want to demonstrate the beneﬁts of the
approximation of an inherently rather complex inﬁnite-horizon central-bank projection models of
the economy to much simpler ﬁnite-horizon projection models that are much easier to use but still
arbitrarily close approximations to the inﬁnite-horizon models.
The decision process of modern monetary policy has several distinct characteristics (see Brash [4],
Sims [19], and Svensson [22]):
1. Large amounts of data about the state of the economy and the rest of the world, including
private-sector expectations and plans, are collected, processed, and analyzed before each
major decision.
2. Because of lags in the transmission process, monetary-policy actions aﬀect the economy with a
lag. For this reason alone, good monetary policy must be forward-looking, aim to inﬂuence the
future state of the economy, and therefore rely on forecasts–projections. Central-bank staﬀ
and policymakers make projections of the future development of a number exogenous vari-
ables, such as foreign developments, import supply, export demand, ﬁscal policy, productivity
growth, and so forth. They also construct projections of a number of endogenous variables,
quantities and prices, under alternative assumptions, including alternative assumptions about
the future path of instrument rates. The policymakers are presented with projections of the
most important variables, including target variables such as inﬂation and output, often under
alternative assumptions about exogenous variables and, in particular, the instrument rate
(such as the instrument rate being constant, following market expectations, following some
2arbitrary reaction function, or being optimal relative to a speciﬁc objective function).
3. Throughout this process, a considerable amount of judgment is applied to assumptions and
projections. Projections and monetary-policy decisions cannot rely on models and simple
observable data alone. All models are drastic simpliﬁcations of the economy, and data give a
very imperfect view of the state of the economy. Therefore, judgmental adjustments in both
the use of models and the interpretation of their results–adjustments due to information,
knowledge, and views outside the scope of any particular model–are a necessary and essential
component in modern monetary policy.
4. Based on this large amount of information and analysis, the policymakers decide on a current
instrument rate, such that the corresponding projections of the target variables look good
relative to the central bank’s objectives. Since the projections of the target variables depend
insigniﬁcantly on the current instrument-rate setting and mainly on the whole path of future
instrument rates, the policymakers, explicitly or implicitly, actually choose an instrument-
rate projection–an instrument-rate plan–and the current instrument-rate decision can be
seen as the ﬁrst element of that plan.
5. Finally, the current instrument rate is announced and implemented. In many cases, the
corresponding projections for inﬂation and output or the output gap are also announced. In
a few cases, an instrument-rate projection is announced as well.5
This process makes the current instrument-rate decision a very complex function of the large
amounts of data and judgment that have entered into the process. I believe that it is not very helpful
to summarize this function as a simple reaction function such as a Taylor rule. Furthermore, the
resulting complex reaction function is a reduced form, which depends on the central-bank objectives,
its view of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, the data the central bank has collected,
and the judgment it has exercised. It is the endogenous complex result of a complex process. In
no way is this reaction function structural, in the sense of being invariant to the central bank’s
view of the transmission mechanism and private-sector behavior, or the amount of information and
judgmental adjustments. Still, much current literature treats monetary policy as characterized by
a given reaction function that is essentially structural and invariant to changes in the model of the
economy. Treating the reaction function as a reduced form is a ﬁrst step in a sensible theory of
5 The Reserve Bank of New Zealand has published an instrument-rate projection for many years. The Bank of
Norway is increasingly providing more information about the future path of the instrument rate.
3monetary policy. But, fortunately, this complex reduced-form reaction function need not be made
explicit. It is actually not needed in the modern monetary-policy process.
However, there is a convenient, more structural representation of monetary policy, namely in
the form of a targeting rule, as advocated recently in some detail in Svensson and Woodford [30]
and Svensson [25] and earlier more generally in Svensson [21]. An optimal targeting rule is a ﬁrst-
order condition for optimal monetary policy. It corresponds to the standard eﬃciency condition
of equality between the marginal rates of substitution and the marginal rates of transformation
between the target variables, the former given by the monetary-policy loss function, the latter
given by the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. An optimal targeting rule is invariant to
everything else in the model, including additive judgment and the stochastic properties of additive
shocks. Thus, it is a compact, robust, and structural representation of monetary policy, and
much more robust than the optimal reaction function. A simple targeting rule can potentially
be a practical representation of robust monetary policy, a robust monetary policy that performs
reasonably well under diﬀerent circumstances.6
Optimal targeting rules remain a practical way of representing optimal monetary policy in the
small models usually applied for academic monetary-policy analysis. However, for the larger and
higher-dimensional operational macromodels used by many central banks in constructing projec-
tions, the optimal targeting rule becomes more complex and arguably less practical as a representa-
tion of optimal monetary policy. In this paper, it is demonstrated that optimal policy projections,
the projections corresponding to optimal policy under commitment in a timeless perspective, can
easily be derived directly with simple numerical methods, without reference to any optimal target-
ing rule.7 For practical optimal monetary policy, policymakers actually need not know the optimal
targeting rule. Even less do they need to know any reaction function. They only need to ponder
the graphs of the projections of the target variables that are generated in the policy process and
choose the projections of the target variables and the instrument rate that look best relative to the
central bank’s objectives.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 lays out a reasonably general inﬁnite-
horizon model of the transmission mechanism and the central bank’s objectives; deﬁnes projections,
judgment and optimal policy projections; and speciﬁes how the optimal policy can be implemented
6 McCallum and Nelson [15] have recently criticized the advocacy of targeting rules in Svensson [25]. Svensson [26]
rebuts this criticism and gives references to a rapidly growing literature that applies targeting rules to monetary-policy
analysis. Walsh [34] shows a case of equivalence between targeting rules and robust control.
7 Nevertheless, a general form of an optimal targeting rule is derived in appendix F, for the ﬁnite-horizon approx-
imation of the projection model.
4and what information the private sector needs from the central bank. The section also presents a
simple model of judgment, when the deviation is a version of a ﬁnite-order moving average. Then
judgment can be seen as the accumulation of information over time and allows for a recursive
but high-dimensional representation of the dynamics of the deviation and judgment. Finally, the
section represents the optimal policy projections as the solution to a somewhat complex system of
diﬀerence equations, while taking judgment into account. It also makes the point that, fortunately,
the complex reduced-form reaction function need not be made explicit. Section 3 presents a conve-
nient ﬁnite-horizon model for the construction of optimal policy projections, for both forward- and
backward-looking models. This ﬁnite-horizon model can be written as a simple ﬁnite system of lin-
ear equations. Nevertheless, it is an exact or arbitrarily close approximation to the inﬁnite-horizon
model and is easily solved for the optimal policy projections taking judgment into account. Section
4 discusses and speciﬁes monetary policy that disregards judgment and follows diﬀerent instrument
rules, such as variants of the Taylor rule or more complex instrument rules that are optimal in the
absence of judgment. Section 5 gives examples of and compares monetary policy with and without
judgment, for two diﬀerent empirical models of the U.S. economy: the backward-looking model
of Rudebusch and Svensson [18] and the forward-looking New Keynesian model of Lindé [13]. In
these examples, monetary policy with judgment results in substantially better performance than
monetary policy without judgment. This is also the case when monetary policy without judgment is
represented as a Taylor rule where the instrument rate responds to forward-looking variables that
incorporate private-sector judgment (although, as emphasized below, there are serious principal
and practical problems in implementing such an instrument rule). Section 6 presents conclusions.
A separate and extensive appendix contains numerous technical details.8 These include a general
solution of the policy problem and the related system of diﬀerence equations with forward-looking
variables when the deviation is an arbitrary stochastic process; a speciﬁcation of the model when
the deviation and judgment are ﬁnite-order moving-average processes and the application of the
practical method of Marcet and Marimon [14] to that case; the precise mathematical structure of
the ﬁnite-horizon approximation model, including the optimal targeting rule; and details on the
empirical backward- and forward-looking models.
8 The appendix is available at www.princeton.edu/∼svensson.
52. A model of the policy problem with judgment
Consider the following linear model of an economy with a private sector and a central bank,9 in a
form that allows for both predetermined and forward-looking variables as well as judgment,
∙
Xt+1
Cxt+1|t
¸
= A
∙
Xt
xt
¸
+ Bit +
∙
zt+1
0
¸
. (2.1)
Here, Xt is a (column) nX-vector of predetermined variables (one of these may be unity to con-
veniently incorporate constants in the model) in period t; xt is an nx-vector of forward-looking
variables; it is an ni-vector of central-bank instruments (the forward-looking variables and the
instruments are the nonpredetermined variables); zt is an exogenous nX-vector stochastic process
and called the deviation in period t;a n dA, B,a n dC are matrices of the appropriate dimension.
For any variable qt,Il e tqt+τ|t denote private-sector expectations of the realization in period t + τ
of qt+τ conditional on private-sector information available in period t. I assume that the private
sector has rational expectations, given its information.
For increased generality, the model is formulated in terms of an arbitrary number of instruments,
ni. In most practical applications, monetary policy can be seen as having only one instrument–a
short interest rate, the instrument rate–so then ni =1 .
The upper block of (2.1) provides nX equations determining the nX-vector Xt+1 in period t+1
for given Xt, xt, it and zt+1,
Xt+1 = A11Xt + A12xt + B1it + zt+1, (2.2)
where A and B are partitioned conformably with Xt and xt as
A ≡
∙
A11 A12
A21 A22
¸
,B ≡
∙
B1
B2
¸
. (2.3)
The realization of the deviation and the predetermined variables in each period occurs and is
observed by the private sector and the central bank in the beginning of the period (the realization
of zt+1 can be inferred from Xt+1, Xt, xt and it and (2.2)).10
The lower block of (2.1) provides nx equations determining the nx-vector xt in period t for given
xt+1|t, Xt,a n dit,
xt = A−1
22 (Cxt+1|t − A21Xt − B2it); (2.4)
9 For simplicitly, there is no explicit ﬁscal authority in the model, but such an authority and its behavior can be
included in the model (2.1).
10 See Svensson and Woodford [29] for an analysis of optimal policy in a model with forward-looking variables
when the current state of the economy is imperfectly observed and inferred from observed indicators.
6I hence assume that the nx × nx submatrix A22 is invertible. The realization of Xt is observed by
the private sector and the central bank in the beginning of period t; the central bank then sets the
instruments, it; after observing the instruments, the private sector forms its expectations, xt+1|t;
and this ﬁnally determines the forward-looking variables xt.
To assume that the deviation appears only in the upper block of (2.1) is not restrictive. Suppose
that I have a model where the deviation appears in both blocks,
∙
Xo
t+1
Cxt+1|t
¸
=
∙
Ao
11 Ao
12
Ao
21 Ao
22
¸∙
Xo
t
xt
¸
+
∙
Bo
1
Bo
2
¸
it +
∙
zo
1,t+1
zo
2,t
¸
,
By adding the vector zo
t to the predetermined variables, I can always form a new model of the form
(2.1), where
Xt ≡
∙
Xo
t
zo
2t
¸
,A ≡
⎡
⎣
Ao
11 0 Ao
12
000
Ao
21 0 Ao
22
⎤
⎦,B ≡
⎡
⎣
Bo
1
0
Bo
2
⎤
⎦,z t ≡
∙
zo
1t
zo
2
¸
,
and there is no deviation in the lower block.
As in Svensson [25], the deviation represents additional determinants–determinants outside
the model–of the variables in the economy, the diﬀerence between the actual value of a variable
and the value predicted by the model. It can be interpreted as model perturbations, as in the
literature on robust control.11 The central bank’s mean estimate of future deviations will be
identiﬁed with the central bank’s judgment. It represents the unavoidable judgment always applied
in modern monetary policy. Any existing model is always an approximation of the true model
of the economy, and monetary-policy makers always ﬁnd it necessary to make some judgmental
adjustments to the results of any given model. Such judgmental adjustments could refer to future
ﬁscal policy, productivity, consumption, investment, international trade, foreign-exchange and other
risk premia, raw-material prices, private-sector expectations, and so forth. The “add factors”
applied to model equations in central-bank projections (Reifschneider, Stockton, and Wilcox [17])
are an example of central-bank judgment. Given this interpretation of judgment and the deviation
zt+1, it would be completely misleading to make a simplifying assumption such as the deviation
being a simple autoregressive process. In that case, it could just be incorporated among the
predetermined variables. Thus, I will refrain from such an assumption and instead leave the dynamic
properties of zt+1 unspeciﬁed, except in a special case when the deviation is a version of a ﬁnite-
order moving-average process. Generally, the focus will be on the central bank’s judgment of the
whole sequence of future deviations.
11 See, for instance, Hansen and Sargent [10]. However, that literature deals with the more complex case when the
model perturbations are endogenous and chosen by nature to correspond to a worst-case scenario.
7More precisely, let the inﬁnite-dimensional period-t random vector ζt ≡ (z0
t+1,z0
t+2,...)0 (where 0
denotes the transpose) denote the vector of the (in period t) unknown random vectors zt+1, zt+2,...
Let the central bank’s beliefs in period t about the random vector ζt be represented by the inﬁnite-
dimensional probability distribution Φt with distribution function Φt(ζt). The probability distri-
bution Φt may itself be time-varying and stochastic. The central bank is assumed to know the
matrices A, B, C, D,a n dW and the discount factor δ (D, W,a n dδ refer to the central bank’s
objectives and are deﬁned below). The private sector is assumed to know the matrices A, B,a n d
C, but may or may not know the central bank’s objectives (that is, D, W,a n dδ). The private
sector may or may not have the same beliefs about the future deviations as the central bank.
Let Yt be an nY -vector of target variables. For simplicity, these target variables are measured
as the diﬀerence from a ﬁxed nY -vector Y ∗ of target levels. This vector of target levels is held ﬁxed
throughout this paper. In order to examine the consequences of shifting target levels, one only
needs to replace Y t by Y t − Y ∗ throughout the paper. Let the target variables be given by
Yt = D
⎡
⎣
Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦, (2.5)
where D is an nY × (nX + nx + ni) matrix.
Let the central bank’s intertemporal loss function in period t be
Et
∞ X
τ=0
δτLt+τ ≡
Z ∞ X
τ=0
δτLt+τdΦt(ζt), (2.6)
where 0 <δ≤ 1 is a discount factor, Lt is the period loss given by
Lt =
1
2
Y 0
tWYt, (2.7)
and W is a symmetric positive semideﬁnite nY × nY matrix. That is, in period t the central bank
wants to minimize the expected discounted sum of current and future losses, where the expectation
Et is with respect to the distribution Φt.
Since this is a linear model with a quadratic loss function and the random deviations enter addi-
tively, the conditions for certainty equivalence are satisﬁed. Then, as shown in detail in appendix A,
the optimal policy in period t need only consider central-bank mean forecasts–projections–of all
variables, including the inﬁnite-dimensional mean forecast, zt, of the random vector ζt,
zt ≡ Etζt ≡
Z
ζtdΦt(ζt).
8The central-bank projection in period t of the realization of the deviation in period t + τ, zt+τ,i s
denoted zt+τ,t,s ozt ≡ (z0
t+1,t,z0
t+2,t,...)0. The projection zt is identiﬁed with the central bank’s
judgment. Under the assumed certainty equivalence, the projection zt is, for optimal policy, a
suﬃcient statistic for the distribution Φt. Although there is genuine uncertainty about the future
random deviations, ζt, the only thing that matters for policy is the mean, the judgment, zt.T h e
second and higher moments of ζt–the variance, skew, kurtosis, and so forth–do not matter for
policy.12 The judgment can itself be seen as an exogenous inﬁnite-dimensional random vector that
is realized in the beginning of each period and summarizes the central bank’s relevant information
in that period about expected future deviations.
Let qt ≡ (q0
t,t,q0
t+1,t,...)0 denote a central-bank projection in period t for any vector of variables
qt+τ (τ ≥ 0) (with the exception of εt and εt+τ,t, to be introduced below), a central-bank mean
forecast conditional on central-bank information in period t. (Thus, for variables other than the
deviation, the projection also includes also the current value, qt,t = qt.) The central bank then
constructs various projections of the endogenous variables to be used in its decision process. These
projections of endogenous variables may be conditional on various assumptions. In order to keep
private-sector expectations and central-bank projections conceptually distinct, I denote the former
by qt+τ|t and the latter by qt+τ,t for any variable qt.
For given judgment, zt, the projection model of the central bank for the projections (Xt,x t,
it,Yt) in period t–the model the central bank uses in the decision process to consider alternative
projections–will be
∙
Xt+τ+1,t
Cxt+τ+1,t
¸
= A
∙
Xt+τ,t
xt+τ,t
¸
+ Bit+τ,t+
∙
zt+τ+1,t
0
¸
, (2.8)
Yt+τ,t = D
⎡
⎣
Xt+τ,t
xt+τ,t
it+τ,t
⎤
⎦ (2.9)
for τ ≥ 0,w h e r eXt,t satisﬁes
Xt,t = Xt, (2.10)
since the realization of the predetermined variables is assumed to be observed in the beginning of
period t.
In order to introduce more compact notation, let the (nX+nx+ni)-vector st ≡ (X0
t,x 0
t,i 0
t)0 denote
the state of the economy in period t, and let the vector st+τ,t ≡ (X0
t+τ,t,x 0
t+τ,t,i 0
t+τ,t)0 denote the
12 The variance of the future deviations will add a term to the intertemporal loss, but that term is independent of
policy.
9projection in period t of the state of the economy in period t+τ.F i n a l l y ,l e tt h ei n ﬁnite-dimensional
vector st ≡ (s0
t,t,s 0
t+1,t,s t+2,t,...)0 denote a projection in period t of the (current and future) states
of the economy. By (2.9), I can write the projection of the target variables in a compact way, as a
linear function of the projection of the states of the economy, as
Y t = ˜ Dst, (2.11)
where ˜ D is an inﬁnite-dimensional block-diagonal matrix with the τ +1-th diagonal block equal to
D for τ ≥ 0.
The set of feasible projections of the states of the economy in period t, St,c a nn o wb ed e ﬁned
as the set of projections st that satisfy (2.8)-(2.10) for given Xt and zt.
The intertemporal loss function (2.6) with (2.7) induces an intertemporal loss function for the
target-variable projection,13
L(Y t) ≡
∞ X
τ=0
δτY 0
t+τ,tWYt+τ,t, (2.12)
The policy problem in period t is to ﬁnd the optimal policy projection (ˆ st, ˆ Y t), the projection
that minimizes (2.12) over the set of feasible projections of the states of the economy, that is,
subject to (2.8)-(2.11) for τ ≥ 0 for given Xt and zt. More compactly,
ˆ st =a r gm i n
st∈St
L( ˜ Dst), (2.13)
ˆ Y t ≡ ˜ Dˆ s; and the optimal policy projection ( ˆ Xt, ˆ xt,ˆ ıt) of the predetermined variables, forward-
looking variables, and instruments can be extracted from ˆ st.
The policy problem will be further speciﬁed below to correspond to commitment in a “timeless
perspective,” in order to avoid any time-consistency problems (see Woodford [36] and Svensson and
Woodford [30]).
2.1. Implementation and what information the private sector needs
The implementation of the optimal policy in period t involves announcing the optimal policy
projection and setting the instruments in period t equal to the ﬁrst element of the instrument
projection,
it =ˆ ıt,t.
13 Note that minEt
S∞
τ=0 δ
τLt+τ =m i n {L(Y
t)+E t
S∞
τ=0 δ
τ(Yt+τ − Yt+τ,t)
0W(Yt+τ − Yt+τ,t)} =m i n {L(Y
t)+ S∞
τ=0 δ
τtrace(WCovtYt+τ)}. By certainty equivalence, CovtYt+τ ≡ Et(Yt+τ − Yt+τ,t)(Yt+τ − Yt+τ,t)
0 ≡
U
(Yt+τ −
Yt+τ,t)(Yt+τ − Yt+τ,t)
0dΦt(ζ
t) is independent of policy, so minimizing (2.12) in period t implies the same policy as
minimizing (2.6) in period t.
Furthermore, note that, since trace(WCovtYt+τ) will normally be strictly positive, (2.6) will normally converge
only for δ<1, whereas (2.12) will normally converge also for δ =1 .
10In period t +1 , conditional on new realizations of the predetermined variables, Xt+1,a n dt h e
judgment, zt+1, a new optimal policy projection, ( ˆ Xt+1, ˆ xt+1,ˆ ıt+1, ˆ Y t+1), is found and announced
together with a new instrument setting,
it+1 =ˆ ıt+1,t+1.
In a forward-looking model, the private sector (including policymakers other than the central
bank) will need to know at least parts of the aggregate projections ˆ Xt, ˆ xt,a n dˆ ıt, in order to make
decisions consistent with these and make the rational-expectations equilibrium in the economy
correspond to the central bank’s optimal policy projection. If the private sector knows the matrices
A, B, C, D,a n dW and the discount factor δ and has the same judgment zt as the central bank,
it can in principle compute the optimal policy projection itself–assuming that it has the same
computational capacity as the central bank.
However, the private sector actually needs to know less. An assumption maintained through
this paper is that the private sector knows the model (2.1), in the sense of knowing the matrices
A, B,a n dC. Furthermore, it observes Xt (determined by Xt−1, xt−1,a n dit−1 in period t−1 and
the realization of zt in the beginning of period t according to (2.2)) in the beginning period t,t h e n
observes it =ˆ ıt,t set by the central bank, thereafter forms one-period-ahead expectations xt+1|t,a n d
ﬁnally determines (and thereby knows) xt; after this, period t ends. In order to make decisions in
period t consistent with the optimal policy projection–that is, decisions resulting in xt =ˆ xt,t from
(2.4)–the private sector needs be able to form expectations xt+1|t =ˆ xt+1,t. The most direct way is if
the central bank announces ˆ xt+1,t and the private sector believes the announcement. Formally, ˆ xt+1,t
is the minimum additional information the private sector needs. However, the central bank may
have to provide the whole optimal policy projection, and also motivate the underlying judgment,
in order to demonstrate the optimal policy projections are internally consistent with the model
(2.1). In particular, the private sector may not believe ˆ xt+1,t unless it is apparently consistent with
the whole projection ˆ ıt. Furthermore, the private sector will need to know the central bank’s loss
function–D, W,a n dδ–in order to judge whether the projections announced are really optimal
relative to the central bank’s loss function and thereby incentive-compatible, credible. Only then
may the central bank be able to convince the private sector to form expectations according to
the optimal policy projection.14 Indeed, the private sector completely trusting the central bank’s
isolated announcement of ˆ xt+1,t could invite misleading announcements, given the time-consistency
14 Being explicit about the loss function and announcing the optimal policy projection also seem to take care of
the criticism of real-world inﬂation targeting expressed by Faust and Henderson [6].
11problem discussed below.15 16
2.2. Judgment as a ﬁnite-order moving average
Consider the special case when the deviation is a version of a moving-average stochastic process
with a given ﬁnite order T>0 (where T could be relatively large),
zt+1 = εt+1 +
T X
j=1
εt+1,t+1−j, (2.14)
where ˜ εt ≡ (ε0
t,ε t0)0 ≡ (ε0
t,ε 0
t+1,t,...,ε 0
t+T,t)0 is a zero-mean iid random (T +1 ) nX-vector realized in
the beginning of period t and called the innovation in period t.17 For T =0 , zt+1 is a simple iid
disturbance. For T>0, the deviation is a version of a moving-average process.
It follows that the central-bank judgment zt+τ,t (τ ≥ 1)i sa l s oaﬁnite-order moving average
and satisﬁes
zt+τ,t ≡ Etzt+τ =
T X
j=τ
εt+τ,t+τ−j = εt+τ,t+
T X
j=τ+1
εt+τ,t+τ−j = εt+τ,t+ zt+τ,t−1.
Hence, εt+τ,t = zt+τ,t − zt+τ,t−1 can be interpreted as the innovation in period t to the previous
judgment zt+τ,t−1, the new information the central bank receives in period t about the realization
of zt+τ in period t + τ. Hence, the judgment zt+τ,t in period t is the sum of current and previous
information about zt+τ. For horizons larger than T, the central-bank judgment is constant and,
without loss of generality, equal to zero,
zt+τ,t =0 ( τ>T ). (2.15)
The dynamics of the deviation zt and the judgment zt+1 can then be written as
∙
zt+1
zt+1
¸
= Az
∙
zt
zt
¸
+
∙
εt
εt+1
¸
, (2.16)
where the (T +1 ) nX × (T +1 ) nX matrix Az is deﬁned as
Az ≡
⎡
⎣
0nX×nX InX 0nX×(T−1)nX
0(T−1)nX×nX 0(T−1)nX×nX I(T−1)nX
0nX×nX 0nX×nX 0nX×(T−1)nX
⎤
⎦,
15 See Geraats [7] for such examples.
16 In a much noted contribution, Morris and Shin [16] and Amato, Morris, and Shin [1] have emphasized the pos-
sibility that public information may be bad and reduce social welfare by crowding out private information. Svensson
[27] scrutinizes this results and shows that, in the model considered by Morris and Shin, public information actually
increases social welfare for reasonable parameters.
17 Note that ε
t ≡ (ε
0
t+1,t,ε
0
t+2,t,...,ε
0
t+T,t)
0 here denotes a random vector realized in the beginning of period t and
not the projection in period t of the random variables εt+1, εt+2,. . . , εt+T. That projection is always zero under the
above assumption of ε
t being a zero-mean iid random variable.
12where 0m×n and Im denote an m×n zero matrix and an n×n identity matrix, respectively. Thus, the
dynamics of the deviation and the judgment has a convenient linear and recursive representation.
The modeling of the dynamics of the deviation, zt, and the additive judgment, zt,i n( 2 . 1 6 )
allows for a relatively ﬂexible accumulation of information about future deviations. Whereas the
stochastic process for the deviation is not a simple Markov process in terms of itself but a ﬁnite-order
moving-average process, it can be written as a higher-dimensional AR(1) process. The restriction
imposed is that the innovation is zero-mean and iid across periods. There is no restriction of
t h ev a r i a n c ea n dc o v a r i a n c eo ft h ee l e m e n t so f˜ εt within the period. It follows that, for instance,
εt+τ,t may have a variance that is decreasing in τ, corresponding to a situation where there is less
information about the mean projection of deviations further into the future; by assumption, there
is no speciﬁc information about the deviation for τ>T . For given t, there may be serial correlation
of εt+τ,t across τ, corresponding to new information about serially correlated future deviations.
2.3. Representing optimal policy projections
Without the judgment terms (or, alternatively, with the deviation being an iid zero-mean process
or an autoregressive process with iid shocks), the above inﬁnite-horizon linear-quadratic problem
with forward-looking variables is a well-known problem, examined and solved in Backus and Driﬃll
[2], Currie and Levine [5], and Söderlind [20]. The traditional way to ﬁnd a solution to this problem
is to derive the ﬁrst-order conditions for an optimum and combine the ﬁrst-order conditions with
the model (2.1) to form a system of diﬀerence equations with an inﬁnite horizon. The solution
can then also be expressed as a diﬀerence equation. Furthermore, Marcet and Marimon [14] have
shown a new practial way of reformulating the problem with forward-looking variables as a recursive
saddlepoint problem (see appendix D).
A new element here is the solution with the judgment. For the case when the deviation is a ﬁnite-
order moving average, the dynamics of the deviation and the judgment, (2.16), can be incorporated
with (2.1), the vector of predetermined variables can be expanded to include zt, and the standard
solution can be applied directly.18 The details for this case are provided in appendices C and D.
When the judgment is a realization of an inﬁnite-dimensional random vector, the standard solution
has to be modiﬁed to take that into account. The details of that solution in the form of a diﬀerence
equation are explained in appendices A and B. Here I shall ﬁrst report the solution in the form of
an inﬁnite-horizon diﬀerence equation and later develop a very convenient ﬁnite-horizon version of
18 Since zt is incorporated in Xt, one does not need to add zt as a separate predetermined variable.
13the model.
Under the assumption of optimization under commitment, one way to describe the optimal
policy projection is by the following diﬀerence equations,
∙
ˆ xt+τ,t
ˆ ıt+τ,t
¸
= F
⎡
⎣
ˆ Xt+τ,t
zt+τ,t
Ξt+τ−1,t
⎤
⎦, (2.17)
∙ ˆ Xt+τ+1,t
Ξt+τ,t
¸
= M
⎡
⎣
ˆ Xt+τ,t
zt+τ,t
Ξt+τ−1,t
⎤
⎦, (2.18)
for τ ≥ 0,w h e r e ˆ Xt,t = Xt. When the deviation is a ﬁnite-order moving average and the judgment is
ﬁnite-dimensional, zt+τ,tdenotes the TnX-vector (z0
t+τ+1,t,z0
t+τ+2,t,...,z0
t+τ+T,t)0,w h e r ezt+τ+j,t =0
for j + τ>T . When the judgment is inﬁnite-dimensional, zt+τ,t denotes the inﬁnite-dimensional
vector (z0
t+τ+1,t,z0
t+τ+2,t,...)0. In the former case, F and M are ﬁnite-dimensional matrices. In
the latter case, F and M include a linear operator R on zt+τ,t (an inﬁnite-dimensional matrix) of
the form
P∞
j=0 Rjzt+1+τ+j,t,w h e r e{Rj}∞
j=0 is a sequence of matrices. The matrices F, M,a n d
{Rj}∞
j=0 depend on A, B, C, D, W,a n dδ, but they are independent of the second and higher
moments of the deviation. The nX-vector Ξt+τ,t consists of the Lagrange multipliers of the lower
block of (2.8), the block determining the projection of the forward-looking variables.
As discussed in appendix A, the value of the initial Lagrange multiplier, Ξt−1,t, is zero, if there is
commitment from scratch in period t, that is, disregarding any previous commitments. This reﬂects
a time-consistency problem when there is reoptimization and recommitment in later periods, as
is inherently the case in practical monetary policy. Instead, I assume that the optimization is
under commitment in a timeless perspective. Then, if the optimization, and reoptimization, under
commitment in a timeless perspective started in an earlier period and has occurred since then, the
initial value of the Lagrange multiplier satisﬁes
Ξt−1,t = Ξt−1,t−1, (2.19)
where Ξt−1,t−1 denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the lower block of (2.8) for the determination of
xt−1,t−1 in the decision problem in period t − 1. The dependence of the optimal policy projection
in period t on this Lagrange multiplier from the decision problem in the previous period makes the
optimal policy projection depend on previous projections and illustrates the history dependence of
optimal policy under commitment in a forward-looking model shown in Backus and Driﬃll [2] and
Currie and Levin [5] and especially examined and emphasized in Woodford [36].
14It follows from (2.17)-(2.19) and (2.11) that the optimal policy projection of the states of the
economy, the target variables, and the instruments will be linear functions of Xt, zt,a n dΞt−1,t−1,
which can be written in a compact way as
ˆ st = H
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1
⎤
⎦, ˆ Y t = ˜ DH
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1
⎤
⎦, ˆ ıt = Hi
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1
⎤
⎦, (2.20)
where H is an appropriately formed inﬁnite-dimensional matrix, and Hi is an inﬁnite-dimensional
submatrix of H consisting of the rows corresponding to the instruments. In particular, the instru-
ment setting in period t will be given by
it =ˆ ıt,t = h
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1
⎤
⎦, (2.21)
where the ﬁnite- or inﬁnite-dimensional matrix h consists of the ni ﬁrst rows of the matrix Hi.
As explained in Svensson and Woodford [30], a simple way of imposing the timeless perspective
is to add a term to the intertemporal loss function (2.12),
L(Y t)+Ξt−1,t−1
1
δ
Cxt,t. (2.22)
In the policy problem in period t − 1, Ξt−1,t−1C can be interpreted as the marginal loss in period
t − 1 of a change in the one-period-ahead projection of the forward-looking variables, xt,t−1.T h e
time-consistency problem arises from disregarding that marginal loss in the policy problem in
period t. Adding the corresponding term to the loss function in period t as in (2.22) handles the
time-consistency problem, and the optimal policy under commitment in the timeless perspective
will result from minimizing (2.22) subject to (2.8)-(2.10) for given Xt, zt,a n dΞt−1,t−1.19 Since xt,t
is an element of the projection st, the optimal policy projection ˆ st is then deﬁned as
ˆ st =a r gm i n
st∈St
{L( ˜ Dst)+Ξt−1,t−1
1
δ
Cxt,t}, (2.23)
for given Xt, zt,a n dΞt−1,t−1.
From (2.18) follows that the Lagrange multiplier Ξt,t, to be used in the decision problem in
period t +1 ,w i l lb eg i v e nb y
Ξt,t = HΞ
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1
⎤
⎦, (2.24)
19 Alternatively, as discussed in Giannoni and Woodford [8] and Svensson and Woodford [30], one can impose the
constraint
xt,t = Fx
%
Xt
z
t
Ξt−1,t−1
&
,
where F in (2.17) is suitably partitioned. In the present context, it is more practical to add the term to the
intertemporal loss function as in (2.22).
15where HΞ is a ﬁnite- or inﬁnite-dimensional matrix.
Let the set of feasible target-variable projections in period t, Yt,b ed e ﬁned as the set of target-
variable projections satisfying (2.11) for projections st in the set St for given Xt and zt.I n t h e
special case where the forward-looking variables, xt, happen to be target variables and elements
in Yt,s oxt,t is an element of Y t, the optimal target-variable projection, ˆ Y t,c a nb ed e ﬁned as the
target-variable projection Y t that minimizes (2.22) on the set Yt,f o rg i v e nXt, zt,a n dΞt−1,t−1,
ˆ Y t =a r g m i n
Y t∈Yt
{L(Y t)+Ξt−1,t−1
1
δ
Cxt,t}.
However, in the more general case when some or all forward-looking variables are not target vari-
ables, xt,t is not an element of Y t, and the optimal policy projection has to be found by optimization
over the set St, as in (2.23).
2.4. Backward-looking model
In a backward-looking model, there are no forward-looking variables: nx =0 . There is no lower
block in (2.1) and (2.8), and there are no forward-looking variables in (2.5) and (2.9). There are
no projections of forward-looking variables and Lagrange multipliers in (2.17), (2.18), (2.20), and
(2.21). There is no time consistency problem and no need to consider commitment in a timeless
perspective.
Hence, for a backward-looking model, the optimal target-variable projection can always be
found by minimizing (2.12) over the set of feasible target-variable projections,
ˆ Y t =a r g m i n
Y t∈Yt
L(Y t),
for given Xt and zt.
2.5. The complex reduced-form reaction function need not be made explicit
The compact notation for the determination of the period-t instrument it in (2.21) and the Lagrange
multiplier Ξt,t in (2.24) may have given the impression that optimal monetary policy is just a
matter of calculating the ﬁnite- or inﬁnite-dimensional matrices h and HΞ once and for all; then, in
each period, ﬁrst observe Xt,f o r mzt, and recall Ξt−1,t−1 from last period’s decision; then simply
compute, announce, and implement it from (2.21); and ﬁnally compute Ξt,t to be used in next
period’s decision.
16This is a misleading impression, though. First, h and HΞ are indeed high- or inﬁnite-dimensional
and therefore diﬃcult to grasp and interpret. Second, zt is also high- or inﬁnite-dimensional.
It is diﬃcult to conceive of policymakers or even staﬀ pondering pages and pages, or computer
screens and computer screens, of huge arrays of numbers in small print, arguing and debating
about adjustments of the numbers of zt, such as the numbers in rows 220—250 and 335—385. Third,
no central bank (certainly no central bank that I have any more thorough information about)
behaves in that way, and is ever likely to behave that way. Instead, the practical presentation
of information and options to policymakers is always in the form of multiple graphs, modest-size
tables, and modest amounts of text.
Fourth, the intertemporal loss function L(Y t) has the projections of the target variables as its
argument. What matters for the construction of the target variables is the whole projection path
of the instruments, not the current instrument setting. The obvious conclusion is that the relevant
objects of importance in the decision process are the whole projection paths of the target variables
and the instruments, not the current instrument setting or projections of the target variables at some
ﬁxed horizon. These projection paths are most conveniently illustrated as graphs. Indeed, graphs of
projections are prominent in the existing monetary-policy reports where projections are reported.
The analytical techniques discussed in this paper should predominantly be seen as techniques for
computer-generated graphs of whole projection paths. Pondering such graphs is an essential part
of the monetary-policy decision process. Importantly, policymakers need not know the underlying
detailed high- or inﬁnite-dimensional matrices behind the construction of those graphs. Therefore,
the complex reduced-form reaction functions embedded in these matrices need not be made explicit.
Fifth, in the discussion in section 2.1, there was no reference to the reaction function, only to
the optimal policy projection. Given Xt and it, the private sector needs to be able to form the
expectations xt+1|t in order to make decisions in period t. The minimum for this is the central
bank’s announcement of ˆ xt+1,t. In order to make that announcement credible, the central bank
may have to announce the complete optimal policy projection and motivate its judgment. But it
does not need to announce any reaction function. In principle, given the reaction function, the
private sector could combine the reaction function with the model and solve for the optimal policy
projection, but that is an overwhelmingly complicated and roundabout way.
173. A ﬁnite-horizon projection model
Regardless of whether the judgment is ﬁnite- or inﬁnite-dimensional (that is, whether (2.15) holds
or not), the problem of minimizing the intertemporal loss function is an inﬁnite-horizon problem.
From a practical and computational point of view, it is convenient to transform the inﬁnite-horizon
policy problem above to a ﬁnite-horizon one. When the judgment satisﬁes (2.15), this can be done
in a simple and approximate, but arbitrarily close to exact, way for the forward-looking model, and
in a simple and exact way for the backward-looking model. The ﬁnite-horizon model also makes
it very easy to incorporate any arbitrary constraints on the projections, for instance, a particular
form of the instrument projection, such as a constant instrument for some periods. Then, all the
relevant projection paths are computed in one simple step.
3.1. Forward-looking model
Suppose that the estimate of the deviation is constant beyond a ﬁxed horizon T. Without loss of
generality, assume that the constant is zero.20 That is, I assume (2.15).
Start by writing the projection model (2.8) and (2.10) for τ =0 ,...,T− 1 as
Xt,t = Xt, (3.1)
− ˜ Ast+τ,t+
∙
Xt+τ+1,t
Cxt+τ+1,t
¸
=
∙
zt+τ+1,t
0
¸
(τ =0 ,...,T − 1). (3.2)
where ˜ A is the (nX +nx)×(nX +nx+ni) matrix deﬁned by ˜ A ≡ [AB ].T h eﬁrst nX equations of
the last block of nX +nx equations in (3.2) determine Xt+T,t for given Xt+T−1,t, xt+T−1,t, it+T−1,t,
and zt+T,t.T h el a s tnx equations of that block are
−A21Xt+T−1,t − A22xt+T−1,t − B2it+T−1,t + Cxt+T,t =0 .
They determine xt+T−1,t for given Xt+T−1,t and it+T−1,t, and, importantly, for given xt+T,t.A
problem is that nx equations determining xt+T,t are lacking. I will assume that xt+T,t is determined
by the assumption that xt+T+1,t is equal to its steady-state level. That is, I assume that the optimal
policy projection has the property that, for (2.15), it approaches a steady state when T →∞ .T h i s
is true for the models and loss functions considered here. Without loss of generality, I assume that
the steady-state values for the forward-looking variables are zero,
xt+T+1,t =0 . (3.3)
20 If the estimate of the deviation from horizon T on is constant but nonzero, it can be incorporated among
other constants in the model. If the estimate of the deviation from horizon T on is not constant but follows an
autoregressive process (for instance, if it is assumed to gradually approach a constant), it can be incorporated among
the predetermined variables.
18From this follows that Xt+T,t, xt+T,t,a n dit+T,t must satisfy
−A21Xt+T,t − A22xt+T,t − B2it+T,t =0 , (3.4)
which gives me the desired nx equations for xt+T,t.
Let st, the projection of the states of the economy, now denote the ﬁnite-dimensional (T +1)×
(nX + nx + ni)-vector st ≡ (s0
t,t,s 0
t+1,t,...,s 0
t+T,t)0. Similarly, let all projections qt for q = X, x, i
and Y now denote the ﬁnite-dimensional vector qt ≡ (q0
t,t,q0
t+1,t,...,q0
t+T,t)0.F i n a l l y ,l e t zt be the
TnX-vector zt ≡ (z0
t+1,t,z0
t+2,t,...,z0
t+T,t)0 (recall that zt does not include the component zt).
The ﬁnite-horizon projection model for the projection of the states of the economy, st,t h e n
consists of (3.1), (3.2) and (3.4). It can be written compactly as
Gst = gt, (3.5)
where G is the (T +1 ) ( nX + nx) ×(T +1)(nX + nx +ni) matrix formed from the matrices on the
left side of (3.1), (3.2), and (3.4), and gt is a (T +1 ) ( nX + nx)-vector formed from the right side
of (3.1), (3.2), and (3.4) as gt ≡ (X0
t,z0
t+1,t,00,z0
t+2,t,00,...,z0
t+T,t,00,00)0 (where zeros denote zero
vectors of appropriate dimension).
Since Y t now denotes the ﬁnite-dimensional (T +1 ) nY -vector Y t ≡ (Y 0
t,t,Y0
t+1,t,...,Y0
t+T,t)0,I
can write
Y t = ˜ Dst, (3.6)
where ˜ D now denotes a ﬁnite-dimensional (T +1)nY ×(T +1)(nX +nx+ni) block-diagonal matrix
with the matrix D in each diagonal block.
The set of feasible projections, St,i st h e nd e ﬁned as the ﬁnite-dimensional set of st that satisfy
( 3 . 5 )a n d( 3 . 6 )f o rag i v e ngt,t h a ti s ,f o rag i v e nXt and zt.
It remains to specify the intertemporal loss function in the forward-looking model in the ﬁnite-
horizon case. In the forward-looking model, under assumption (2.15), the minimum loss from the
horizon T +1on depends on the projection of the predetermined variables for period t + T +1 ,
Xt+T+1,t, and the Lagrange multipliers Ξt+T,t according to the quadratic form
1
2
δT+1 £
X0
t+T+1,t Ξ0
t+T,t
¤
V
∙
Xt+T+1,t
Ξt+T,t
¸
,
where V is a symmetric positive semideﬁnite matrix that depends on the matrices A, B, C, D,a n d
W and the discount factor δ (see appendix A). It follows from (2.18) and (2.15) that this quadratic
19form can be written as a function Xt+T,t and Ξt+T−1,t as21
1
2
δT+1 £
X0
t+T,t Ξ0
t+T−1,t
¤
M0VM
∙
Xt+T,t
Ξt+T−1,t
¸
. (3.7)
In principle, I could use (2.18) to keep track of Ξt+T−1,t. However, a simpler way is to extend the
horizon T so far that Xt+T,t and Ξt+T−1,t are arbitrarily close to their steady-state levels. Without
loss of generality, I assume that the steady-state levels are zero, in which case the above quadratic
form is zero, and the loss from horizon T can be disregarded. Checking that Xt+T,t is close to zero
is straightforward; I will show a practical way to check that Ξt+T−1,t is also close to zero.22
Under this assumption, it follows from (2.9), (2.12), and (3.6) that the intertemporal loss
function can be written as a function of st as the ﬁnite-dimensional quadratic form
1
2
st0Ωst, (3.8)
where Ω is a symmetric positive semideﬁnite block-diagonal (T +1)(nX +nx +ni) matrix with its
(τ +1 ) -th diagonal block being δτD0WD for 0 ≤ τ ≤ T. However, in order to impose the timeless
perspective, as explained in section 2.3, I need to add the term
Ξt−1,t−1
1
δ
Cxt,t
to the loss function, where Ξt−1,t−1 is the relevant Lagrange multiplier from the policy problem in
period t−1. This term can be written ω0
t−1st, with the appropriate deﬁnition of the (T +1)(nX +
nx +ni)-vector ωt−1 as ωt−1 ≡ (0,0 00,(Ξt−1,t−1
1
δC)0,00,...,00)0 (where the zeros denote zero vectors
of appropriate dimension). Thus, the intertemporal loss function with the added term is
1
2
st0Ωst + ω0
t−1st. (3.9)
Then, the policy problem is to ﬁnd the optimal policy projection ˆ st that minimizes (3.9) subject
to (3.5). The Lagrangian for this problem is
1
2
st0Ωst + ω0
t−1st + Λt0(Gst − gt), (3.10)
where Λt is the (T +1)( nX +nx)-vector of Lagrange multipliers of (3.5). The ﬁrst-order condition
is
st0Ω + ω0
t−1 + Λt0G =0 .
21 The matrix M appearing in (3.7) is the matrix M in (2.18) with the columns corresponding to z
t deleted.
22 Appendix E presents an iterative numerical procedure that will provide a projection arbitrarily close to the
optimal policy projection without requiring such a long horizon that Xt+T,t and Ξt+T−1,t are close to their steady-
state levels.
20Combining this with (3.5) gives the linear equation system
∙
G 0
Ω G0
¸∙
st
Λt
¸
=
∙
gt
−ωt−1
¸
. (3.11)
The optimal policy projection ˆ st and Lagrange multiplier Λt are then given by the simple matrix
inversion23
∙
ˆ st
Λt
¸
=
∙
G 0
Ω G0
¸−1 ∙
gt
−ωt−1
¸
. (3.12)
The optimal target-variable projection then follows from (3.6). The optimal policy projection is a
linear function of Xt, zt,a n dΞt−1,t−1, and it can be written compactly as in section 2.3,
ˆ st = H
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1
⎤
⎦, ˆ Y t = ˜ DH
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1
⎤
⎦, ˆ ıt = Hi
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1
⎤
⎦,
except that the matrices H and Hi and the vector zt now are ﬁnite-dimensional. The matrices can
be directly extracted from (3.12). The period-t instrument setting can be written
it =ˆ ıt,t = h
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1
⎤
⎦, (3.13)
where the ﬁnite-dimensional matrix h consists of the ﬁrst ni rows of the matrix Hi. Under assump-
tion (2.15) and a suﬃciently long horizon T,t h eﬁnite-horizon projections here are arbitrary close
to the optimal inﬁnite-horizon policy projections for τ =0 ,...,T in section 2.3.
The Lagrange multiplier Λt can be written Λt ≡ (1
δξ0
t,t,ξ0
t+1,t,Ξ0
t,t,δξ0
t+2,t,δΞ0
t+1,t,...,δTξ0
t+T,t,
δTΞ0
t+T−1,t)0,w h e r eξt+τ,t is the vector of Lagrange multipliers for the block of equations in (3.1),
(3.2), and (3.4) determining Xt+τ,t and Ξt+τ−1,t is the vector of Lagrange multipliers for the block
of equations determining xt+τ−1,t. Hence, extraction of Ξt+T−1,t from Λt allows me to check that
the assumption made above of Ξt+T−1,t being close to zero is satisﬁed. If the assumption is not
satisﬁed, the horizon T can be extended until the assumption is satisﬁed.24 Furthermore, Ξt,t can
be extracted from Λt in order to form the vector ωt to be used in the loss function for the policy
problem in period t+1, to ensure the timeless perspective. The Lagrange multiplier needed in the
loss function in period t +1 , Ξt,t, can be written
Ξt,t = HΞ
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1
⎤
⎦, (3.14)
23 Numerically, it is faster to solve the system of linear equations (3.11) by other methods than ﬁrst inverting the
left-side matrix, see Judd [11].
24 In practice, the horizon T is extended until the optimal projection ˆ s
t is insensitive to variations in T.
21where the ﬁnite-dimensional matrix HΞ can be extracted from (3.12).
Again, as noted above in section 2.3, in spite of the compact notation for the instrument it and
Lagrange multiplier Ξt,t in (3.13) and (3.14), these analytical techniques should predominantly be
seen as techniques for computer-generated graphs to be pondered by the policy makers, and the
matrices never need to made explicit to the policymakers. Although the matrices are now formally
ﬁnite-dimensional, they are still high-dimensional and somewhat diﬃcult to interpret.
3.2. Backward-looking model
Make the same assumption (2.15) as for the forward-looking model. The projection in period t of
the state of the economy in period t + τ, st+τ,t,i sn o wd e ﬁned as the (nX + ni)-vector st+τ,t ≡
(X0
t+τ,t,i 0
t+τ,t)0 for τ ≥ 0, in which case I can write, for the backward-looking model,
Xt+τ+1,t = ˜ Ast+τ,t (τ ≥ T). (3.15)
The projection model with horizon T can now be written
Xt,t = Xt, (3.16)
− ˜ Ast+τ,t+ Xt+τ+1,t = zt+τ+1,t (0 ≤ τ ≤ T − 1), (3.17)
where Xt and zt are given. The projection of the states of the economy, st,i sn o wa(T+1)(nX+ni)-
vector. Then the projection model can be written as (3.5), where G is a (T +1)nX×(T +1)(nX+ni)
matrix formed from the left side of (3.16) and (3.17), and gt is a (T +1)nX-vector formed from the
right side of (3.16) and (3.17) as gt ≡ (X0
t,zt0)0.
It is a standard result for a linear-quadratic backward-looking model that the minimum loss
from the horizon T +1on depends on the projection of the predetermined variables for period
t + T +1 , Xt+T+1,t, according to the quadratic form
1
2
δT+1X0
t+T+1,tVX t+T+1,t, (3.18)
where V is a symmetric positive semideﬁnite matrix that depends on the matrices A, B, D,a n d
W and the discount factor δ (see appendix A). I could now, as for the forward-looking model,
assume that the predetermined variables approach a steady-state level for large T, without loss
of generality assume that the steady-state level is zero, and extend the horizon T so far that the
predetermined variables are arbitrarily close to zero, and the loss from period T on is arbitrarily
close to zero. I could then form the ﬁnite-horizon loss function as for the forward-looking model,
22and this together with (3.16) and (3.17) would form the ﬁnite-horizon model, which would be an
arbitrarily close approximation to the inﬁnite-horizon model for suﬃciently large T.
However, the absence of the time-consistency problem and the need to keep track of the Lagrange
multiplier Ξt+T−1,t allows a simple approach, which is exact also for small T,a sl o n ga sa s s u m p t i o n
(2.15) holds for that T. I follow this approach here.
From (3.15) follows that the quadratic form (3.18) can be written as a function of st+T,t as
1
2
δT+1s0
t+T,t ˜ A0V ˜ Ast+T,t.
The ﬁnite-horizon intertemporal loss function can then be written
1
2
T X
τ=0
δτs0
t+τ,tD0WDst+τ,t+
1
2
δT+1s0
t+T,t ˜ A0V ˜ Ast+T,t.
The intertemporal loss function can now be written more compactly as the quadratic form (3.8),
where Ω now is a symmetric positive-semideﬁnite block-diagonal (T +1 ) ( nX + ni)-matrix, whose
(τ +1 ) -th diagonal block is δτD0WD for 0 ≤ τ ≤ T − 1 and whose (T +1 ) -th diagonal block now
is δT(D0WD+ δ ˜ A0V ˜ A).T h u s ,i td i ﬀers from the matrix Ω for the forward-looking model by the
addition of that last term, 1
2δ ˜ A0V ˜ A.
The ﬁnite-horizon policy problem is now to ﬁnd the optimal policy projection ˆ st that minimizes
(3.8) subject to (3.5), for given gt,t h a ti s ,f o rg i v e nXt and zt. The corresponding optimal target-
variable projection ˆ Y t then follows from (3.6).
The Lagrangian for this problem is
1
2
st0Ωst + Λt0(Gst − gt),
where Λt is a vector of Lagrange multipliers for (3.5). The ﬁrst-order condition is
st0Ω + Λt0G =0 .
Combining this with (3.5) gives the linear equation system
∙
G 0
Ω G0
¸∙
st
Λt
¸
=
∙
gt
0
¸
.
The optimal policy projection ˆ st is then given by the simple matrix inversion,
∙
ˆ st
Λt
¸
=
∙
G 0
Ω G0
¸−1 ∙
gt
0
¸
. (3.19)
The optimal target-variable projection then follows from (3.6).
23The optimal policy projection is obviously a linear function of Xt and zt,a n dIc a nw r i t e ,
ˆ st = H
∙
Xt
zt
¸
, ˆ Y t = ˜ DH
∙
Xt
zt
¸
, ˆ ıt = Hi
∙
Xt
zt
¸
,
where the ﬁnite-dimensional matrices H and Hi can be extracted from (3.19). The instrument
setting for period t can be written
it =ˆ ıt,t = h
∙
Xt
zt
¸
, (3.20)
where the ﬁnite-dimensional matrix h consists of the ﬁrst ni rows of the matrix Hi.
3.3. Other considerations
A ﬁnite-horizon projection model has several advantages. One is that it is very easy to incorporate
any restrictions on the projections. Any equality restriction on Xt, xt, it,o rY t can be written
¯ Rst =¯ st,( 3 . 2 1 )
where the number of rows of the matrix ¯ R and the dimension of the given vector ¯ st equal the number
of restrictions. This makes it easy to incorporate any restriction on the instrument projection, for
instance, that it shall be constant or of a particular shape for some periods.
Transforming the model into a ﬁnite system of equations may be particularly practical from a
computational point of view for a nonlinear model. It may then also be easy to handle commitment
in a timeless perspective for a nonlinear model.
4. Monetary policy without judgment
Modern monetary policy inherently to a large extent relies on judgment. Previous sections of this
paper have attempted to model this dependence on judgment in a simple but speciﬁcw a y . T h i s
section attempts to specify monetary policy without judgment, in order to compare monetary policy
with and without judgment.
There are several alternatives in modelling monetary policy without judgment. Above, monetary
policy with judgment has been modeled as forecast targeting, ﬁnding an instrument projection such
that the corresponding projection of the target variables minimizes a loss function. This procedure
uses all information available to the central bank, including central-bank judgment. This results
in a complex reduced-form reaction function, which fortunately never needs to be made explicit.
When modelling monetary policy without judgment, however, the most obvious route is to consider
24monetary policy as a more mechanical process–a commitment to a particular reaction function, a
commitment to a particular instrument rule.25
Instrument rules can be divided into two categories, explicit instrument rules and implicit instru-
ment rules (Svensson and Woodford [30], Svensson [25]). An explicit instrument rule is a reaction
function where the instrument responds to predetermined variables only. Its implementation then
consists of the central bank observing the predetermined variables in the beginning of the period,
and then calculating, announcing, and setting the instrument according to this instrument rule.
The implementation obviously requires that the relevant predetermined variables must be observed
by the central bank, but since the predetermined variables in a particular period are independent
of the instrument setting in that period, no further complications arise. An implicit instrument
rule is a relation between the current instrument and some of the current forward-looking variables.
Then, since the forward-looking variables depend on the instrument setting, the instrument and
the forward-looking variables are simultaneously determined. Thus, an implicit instrument rule is
actually an equilibrium condition, a relation that holds in equilibrium. The implementation of an
implicit instrument rule, that is, how to get to the desired equilibrium, is not trivial but a complex
issue. This fact has largely been overlooked in the literature, except, for instance, in Svensson and
Woodford [30] and Svensson [25].
Here, I shall discuss how monetary policy without judgment can be modeled as a commitment
to an instrument rule, either an explicit instrument rule or an implicit instrument rule, with some
discussion of the implementation of the latter. I will start from the reduced-form reaction function
for the instrument setting that follows from the forecast targeting modeled above. For simplicity, I
now consider the realistic case when there is only one instrument, the instrument rate, so ni =1 .
4.1. Explicit instrument rules
The construction of the optimal instrument projection, ˆ ıt, in the forward-looking model results in
an optimal reduced-form reaction function for the current instrument setting, (3.13) (or (2.21)),
which is repeated here as
it = hXXt + hzzt + hΞΞt−1,t−1, (4.1)
where the row vector h is partitioned conformably with Xt, zt,a n dΞt−1,t−1 as h ≡ [hX hz hΞ] (h is
now a row vector, since ni =1 ). The optimal reaction function implies a particular instrument
25 This is an approach that a large part of the literature has taken, for instance, most papers in the conference
volume Taylor [33]. The approach is criticized in Svensson [25] and [26].
25response to the predetermined variables, Xt; the judgment, zt; and the Lagrange multiplier for
the equations for xt−1,t−1 in the policy problem in period t − 1, Ξt−1,t−1. The discussion here
refers to the forward-looking model; for the backward-looking model, I can simply delete the term
hΞΞt−1,t−1.
I want to model the central bank setting its instrument in a mechanical way, via a commitment
to a particular instrument rule, while disregarding judgment. Considering (4.1) as a potential in-
strument rule, it is natural that disregarding judgment means that the central bank behaves as if it
believes that zt =0and hence disregards the judgment term in (4.1), hzzt.T h u s ,monetary policy
without judgment is modeled as the central bank erroneously believing that the expected future devi-
ations equal zero, for instance, the central bank believing that zt is a zero-mean iid process. A ﬁrst
possibility is then that the central bank also disregards the term with the Lagrange multiplier from
the previous policy problem. For one thing, if the central bank did set the instrument mechanically
in period t−1 rather than by explicit optimization, it may not be aware of the Lagrange multiplier
and its value. This leaves responding to the current predetermined variables only,
it = hXXt. (4.2)
Such a policy would be ineﬃcient for two reasons, even if the response coeﬃcients to Xt are those
of the optimal reaction function (4.1). First, it disregards judgment, the term hzzt. Second, it also
disregards the response to lagged predetermined variables implied by the response to the Lagrange
multiplier, Ξt−1,t−1, as indicated in (2.19). Indeed, optimization under discretion would result in a
reduced-form reaction function where the instrument responds only to the current predetermined
variables.26 27
The response to the Lagrange multipliers in (4.1) implies a response to lagged predetermined
variables. Disregarding judgment, the Lagrange multiplier in (3.14) (or (2.24)) follows
Ξt−1,t−1 = HΞXXt−1 + HΞΞΞt−2,t−2
=
∞ X
j=0
H
j
ΞΞHΞXXt−1−j
26 The resulting reduced-form reaction function resulting from optimization under discretion would have diﬀerent
coeﬃcients than the optimal hX. Because of this, and because of the missing response to lagged predetermined
variables, the response is suboptimal and results in so-called stabilization bias relative to the commitment policy
(Svensson and Woodford [30]).
27 Given a particular restricted class of instrument rules, for instance, simple instrument rules with only a few
arguments, one can ﬁnd the optimal instrument rule in that restricted class, see appendix G. The optimal instrument
rule in a restricted class will depend on the stochastic properties of the disturbances to the economy. Many papers
of Taylor [33] provide examples of such optimal restricted instrument rules.
26where HΞ is partitioned conformably with Xt, zt,a n dΞt−1,t−1 as HΞ ≡ [HΞX HΞz HΞΞ].A
second possibility for policy disregarding judgment is then that the policy responds with the optimal
coeﬃcients hΞ to these lagged predetermined variables, resulting in the reaction function
it = hXXt + hΞ
∞ X
j=0
H
j
ΞΞHΞXXt−1−j. (4.3)
This would seem to be an instrument rule corresponding to a rather sophisticated policy, com-
mitment to the reaction function resulting from optimal policy under commitment in a timeless
perspective, while disregarding judgment.28
4.2. Implicit instrument rules
Another apparent possibility would be an implicit instrument rule, where the instrument responds to
the forward-looking variables, xt. This might seem advantageous, since, in a rational-expectations
equilibrium, the forward-looking variables might be aﬀected by private-sector expectations of future
deviations. Then, by responding to forward-looking variables, the central bank might indirectly
take judgment into account, although in this case private-sector judgment. Thus, one might want
to consider an ad hoc implicit instrument rule of the form
it = fXXt + fxxt, (4.4)
where fX and fx are row vectors of given response coeﬃcients.
As mentioned above, there is, however, a speciﬁc problem with the central bank responding
to forward-looking variables, something largely overlooked in the literature (except, for instance,
Svensson and Woodford [30] and Svensson [25]). Since the forward-looking variables depend on
the central bank’s instrument setting, a simultaneity problem arises. The central bank cannot
observe the forward-looking variables before it sets the instrument, and the private sector needs to
observe the instrument setting before it determines the forward-looking variables. A relation such
28 Note that, only if hΞ is invertible, can this be written on the “instrument smoothing” form
it = hXXt + hΞHΞXXt−1 + hΞHΞΞh
−1
Ξ hΞ
∞ [
j=0
H
j
ΞΞHΞXXt−1−j
= hXXt + hΞHΞXXt−1 + hΞHΞΞh
−1
Ξ (it−1 − hXXt−1)
= hXXt + hΞ(HΞX − HΞΞh
−1
Ξ hX)Xt−1 + hΞHΞΞh
−1
Ξ it−1.
If there is only one instrument, hΞ is invertible only if Ξt−1,t−1 is a scalar, that is, if there is only one forward-
looking variable. The point is that the optimal reaction function under commitment usually cannot be written as an
instrument rule involving current predetermined variable and the lagged instrument, unless it−1 happens to be one
of the predetermined variables.
27as (4.4) is actually an equilibrium condition, where it and xt are simultaneously determined. The
implementation of such an equilibrium condition is not straightforward.
A sophisticated way to implement (4.4) is for the central bank to construct projections (Xt,x t,i t)
that satisfy (4.4). The central bank can amend the relation
it+τ,t = fXXt+τ,t+ fxxt+τ,t (4.5)
for τ ≥ 0 to its projection model (3.5) (or (2.8)). It can then solve for the projection ( ˜ Xt, ˜ xt,˜ ıt)
for given Xt, disregarding the judgment (setting zt+τ,t =0for τ ≥ 1). These projections will by
construction satisfy (4.5). The corresponding instrument setting, it =˜ ıt,t, will then be a linear
function of Xt,
it = ˜ fXXt. (4.6)
The central bank can then set this instrument level according to the reduced-form reaction function
(4.6).29
However, if the private sector understands that the central bank is eﬀectively implementing
the reaction function (4.6); has rational expectations of future variables; and, in particular, has
expectations of future nonzero deviations, zt+τ|t 6=0(τ ≥ 1); the resulting market-determined
forward-looking variables, xt, will deviate from the central-bank projection, ˜ xt,t. Thus, although
the instrument setting will satisfy
it = fXXt + fx˜ xt,t,
for the central-bank projection ˜ xt,t,i tw i l lnot satisfy (4.4) for the market-determined forward-
looking variables xt.
29 In the context of the ﬁnite-horizon projection model, relation (4.5) can be written as (T +1 ) ni equations,
¯ Rs
t =0 ,
where ¯ R is an (T +1 ) ni × (T +1 ) ( nX + nx + ni) matrix. Combining these with (3.5) for z
t =0gives an equation
system k
G
¯ R
l
s
t =
k
˜ g
t
0
l
,
where ˜ g
t is the (T +1)(nX +nx)-vector (X
0
t,0
0)
0. Under the assumption that the matrix on the left side has full rank,
s
t is given by
˜ s
t ≡
k
G
¯ R
l−1 k
˜ g
t
0
l
. (4.7)
This results in
˜ xt,t = ˜ Hx0Xt,
where the matrix ˜ Hx0 can be extracted from the right side of (4.7) and
˜ ıt,t = fXXt + fx˜ xt,t =( fX + fx ˜ Hx0)Xt ≡ ˜ fXXt.
28For relation (4.4) to be satisﬁed for the market-determined forward-looking variables, the central
bank has to amend the relation (4.5) for τ ≥ 0 to its production model (3.5) (or (2.8)) and solve
for the projection (Xt,x t,x t) for given Xt, taking the judgment into account.30 This results in
xt,t = ˜ HxX0Xt + ˜ Hxz0zt
it,t = fXXt + fxxt,t =( fX + fx ˜ HxX0)Xt + fx ˜ Hxz0zt
≡ ˜ fXXt + ˜ fzzt.
Thus, the resulting reduced-form reaction function is
it = ˜ fXXt + ˜ fzzt.
If the private sector understands that this is the reaction function followed by the central bank and
has rational expectations corresponding to the same judgment; the market-determined forward-
looking variables, xt, will equal the central-bank projection, xt,t; and the relation (4.4) will be
satisﬁed in equilibrium.
This is of course an example of a central bank explicitly taking judgment into account, not
an example of a central bank disregarding judgment. But instead of ﬁnding the optimal policy
projection, ( ˆ Xt, ˆ xt,ˆ ıt, ˆ Y t), that minimizes its loss function, it ﬁnds the projection (Xt,x t,i t,Yt)
that satisﬁes the ad hoc relation (4.4). Since the latter is no easier than the former and, in
particular, suboptimal, this behavior seems a bit far-fetched.
Thus, I can model monetary policy without judgment as following either the explicit instru-
ment rule (4.2), where both judgment and lagged predetermined variables are ignored, or the more
sophisticated explicit instrument rule (4.3), or perhaps some intermediate case of (4.3) where the
summation is over a ﬁnite past periods. Using the implicit instrument rule (4.4) is somewhat prob-
lematic, since its implementation is complex and open to alternative very diﬀerent interpretations,
30 The equation system is then k
G
R
l
s
t =
k
g
t
0
l
,
where g
t is the (T +1 ) ( nX + nx)-vector (X
0
t,z t,t
0,0
0,z
0
t+1,t,0
0,...,z
0
t+T,t,0
0,0
0)
0 speciﬁed in section 3.1. Under the
assumption that the matrix on the left side has full rank, s
t is given by
s
t =
k
G
R
l−1 k
g
t
0
l
. (4.8)
This results in
xt,t = ˜ HxX0Xt + ˜ Hxz0z
t,
where ˜ HxX0 and ˜ Hxz0 can be extracted from the right side of (4.8) and
it,t = fXXt + fxxt,t =( fX + fx ˜ Hx0)Xt + fx ˜ Hxz0z
t ≡ ˜ fXXt + ˜ fzz
t.
29with very diﬀerent resulting equilibria.
4.3. Taylor rules
In the literature, a number of simple ad hoc instrument rules have been used to discuss and evaluate
monetary policy. The most common are variants of the Taylor rule.31 One variant of the Taylor
rule with instrument smoothing (meaning, in this context, a response to the lagged instrument
rate) is
it =( 1− fi)(fππt + fyyt)+fiit−1;
where πt denotes a measure of the diﬀerence of inﬂation from a given inﬂation target; yt denotes
a measure of the output gap; fπ and fy are given positive coeﬃcients that can be interpreted as
the long-run response to inﬂation and the output gap, respectively; and the coeﬃcient fi satisﬁes
0 ≤ fi ≤ 1.I f i n ﬂation and the output gap are predetermined, this is an explicit instrument
rule, and its implementation only requires that the central bank can observe or estimate current
inﬂation and the output gap. If inﬂation and/or the output gap are forward-looking variables,
this is an implicit instrument rule, where the instrument and the forward-looking variable are
simultaneously determined. As noted above, such an instrument rule is somewhat problematic and
its implementation may need to be further speciﬁed.
One variant of the Taylor rule, a so-called forecast-based or forward-looking Taylor rule, can be
written
it =( 1− fi)[fππt+J,t + fyyt+K,t]+fiit−1;
where πt+J,t denotes a projection of the diﬀerence of inﬂation from an inﬂation target at horizon
J ≥ 0 and yt+K,t denote a projection of the output gap at horizon K ≥ 0, where at least one of J
or K is positive. Such an instrument rule is an explicit or an implicit instrument rule depending
on how the projections are constructed. If the projections are constructed with information that is
predetermined in period t, the projections are predetermined and the instrument rule is explicit. If
the projections are constructed with information that includes simultaneously determined forward-
looking variables, the instrument rule is implicit and hence an equilibrium condition. Again, the
implementation of such an instrument rule is not trivial and open to alternative interpretations.32
31 Koizicki [12] provides a discussion of the usefuleness of Taylor rules.
32 Svensson [24] discusses additional serious problems with forecast-based instrument rules.
305. Examples
In this section, I discuss examples of monetary policy with and without judgment in two diﬀerent
empirical models of the U.S. economy: a backward-looking model due to Rudebusch and Svensson
[18] and a forward-looking model due to Lindé [13].
5.1. Backward-looking model
The backward-looking empirical model of Rudebusch and Svensson [18] has two equations (with
estimates rounded to two decimal points)
πt+1 =0 .70πt − 0.10πt−1 +0 .28πt−2 +0 .12πt−3 +0 .14yt + zπ,t+1 (5.1)
yt+1 =1 .16yt − 0.25yt−1 − 0.10
µ
1
4
Σ3
j=0it−j −
1
4
Σ3
j=0πt−j
¶
+ zy,t+1. (5.2)
The period is a quarter, and πt is quarterly GDP inﬂation measured in percentage points at an
annual rate, yt is the output gap measured in percentage points, and it is the quarterly average of
the federal-funds rate, measured in percentage points at an annual rate. All variables are measured
as diﬀerences from their means, their steady-state levels. The deviations zπ,t+1 and zy,t+1 for
inﬂation and the output gap have been substituted for the shocks of the original Rudebusch-
Svensson model. The predetermined variables are (πt,πt−1,πt−2,πt−2,y t,y t−1,i t−1,i t−2,it−3).S e e
appendix H for details.
The target variables are inﬂation, the output gap, and the ﬁrst-diﬀerence of the federal funds
rate. The period loss function is
Lt =
1
2
[π2
t + λy2
t + ν(it − it−1)2], (5.3)
where πt is measured as the diﬀerence from the inﬂation target, which is equal to the steady-state
level. The discount factor, δ, and the relative weights on the output-gap stabilization, λ,a n d
interest-rate smoothing, ν,i ss e ts oδ =1 , λ =1 ,a n dν =0 .2.
Let me emphasize that there may be considerable uncertainty about the future deviations, ζt,
in this case {zπ,t+τ,z y,t+τ}∞
τ=1. Consider a simple case, when the distribution Φt is such that there
is uncertainty only about zπ,t+τ a n do n l yf o raﬁnite number of quarters, 1 ≤ τ ≤ T. Then, I can
take ζt to be the random T-vector ζt =( zπ,t+1,...,z π,t+T). Suppose furthermore that there are only
four possible events with realizations ζt(j) (j =1 ,2,3,4), and that these are as follows:
1. With probability 0.4: ζt( 1 )=( 0 ,0,...)0, no deviation.
312. With probability 0.3: ζt( 2 )=( 0 ,1.0,1.0,0.0,0.0,0,...)0, a short sequence of large“cost push”
shocks.
3. With probability 0.2, ζt(3) = (0,0.2,0.2,0.2,0.2,0,...)0, a long sequence of small cost-push
shocks.
4. With probability 0.1, ζt(4) = (0,1.0,1.0,1.0,1.0,0,...)0, a long sequence of large cost-push
shocks.
The resulting judgment is the mean of the future deviations, the T-vector zt =0 .4ζt(1)0+0.3ζt(2)0+
0.2ζt(3)0 +0 .1ζt(4)0 =( 0 ,0.44,0.44,0.14,0.14,0,...)0.
Note that the same judgment arises if the probabilities are the same for the four events but the
ﬁrst event is that all components τ =1 ,...,T of ζt have independent uniform distributions between
−1 and 1; the second event is that all components have the same distributions as for the ﬁrst event
except that component τ =2and 3 have independent uniform distributions between 0 and 2;t h e
third event is that all components have the same distributions as for the ﬁrst event except that
component τ =2 , 3, 4, and 5 have independent uniform distributions between −0.8 and 1.2;a n d
the fourth event is that all components have the same distribution as for the ﬁrst event except
that component τ =2 , 3, 4, and 5 have independent uniform distributions between 0 and 2.T h u s ,
behind a given judgment vector can be a distribution Φt involving considerable uncertainty. Still,
only the mean of that distributions matters.
Figure 5.1 shows a situation where the predetermined variables, inﬂation and the output gap,
and the deviations are assumed to have been equal to their steady-state levels, zero, up to quar-
ter 0. Furthermore, in previous quarters, the central bank’s judgment, zt (t<0) has been zero:
The central bank’s expected future inﬂation and output-gap deviations have been zero (although
possibly with large variances).
In panel a, the central bank’s judgment in quarter, z0, changes from that in previous quarters,
such that the central bank’s expected inﬂation deviation equals 1 percentage point for quarter 6,
whereas it is still zero in all other quarters; the expected output-gap deviation is still zero for all
quarters.33 Again, behind these means may be a distribution Φ0 corresponding to considerable
uncertainty. The expected inﬂation deviation, denoted zπ, is marked by circles with no connecting
line. The panel shows the optimal policy projection in quarter 0, (π0,y0,i 0,r0),o fi n ﬂation, π (the
33 In terms of the modeling of the deviation as a mean-average process in section 2.2, panel a shows the impulse
respons to ε
0.
32Figure 5.1: Monetary policy with and without judgment: Backward-looking model
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dashed line); the output gap, y (the dashed-dotted line); the instrument rate, i (the solid line); and
the short real interest rate, r (the dotted line).34
Panel a has two main interpretations. The ﬁrst interpretation is that the panel just shows the
judgment z0 and the optimal policy projection (ˆ π0, ˆ y0,ˆ ı0, ˆ r0) in quarter t =0for the future quarters
τ ≥ 1 and thereby the realization of z0, ˆ π0, ˆ y0, ˆ ı0,a n dˆ r0 in quarter 0. Conditional on the actual
realization of π1 and y1 (in turn depending on the realization of zπ1 and zy1) and the realization
of z1 in quarter t =1 , a new optimal policy projection (ˆ π1, ˆ y1,ˆ ı0, ˆ r0) has to be plotted in quarter
1 for future quarters τ ≥ 2), and so forth for t =2 ,3 ,. . .
The second interpretation is that the panel shows the probability-zero event that the future
realizations of the random deviation zt for t ≥ 1 are exactly equal to the judgment z0 in quarter 0.
That is, the realizations of zπt for t ≥ 1 are zero, except in quarter 6 when it is 1 percentage point,
and the realizations of zyt for t ≥ 1 are all zero. In this interpretation, the panel also shows the
optimal policy projection (ˆ πt, ˆ yt,ˆ ıt, ˆ rt) for each quarter t ≥ 1. These optimal policy projections are
34 The short real interest rate is deﬁned as rt ≡ it − πt+1|t.
33then simply the continuation of the optimal policy projection of the previous quarter. Furthermore,
the actual future realization of inﬂation, the output gap, the instrument rate, and the real interest
rate are then equal to the previous optimal policy projections.
Thus, in the ﬁrst interpretation, panel a just shows a particular realization of the judgment z0
and the corresponding optimal policy projection (ˆ π0, ˆ y0,ˆ ı0, ˆ r0). In the second interpretation, panel
a in addition shows a time series of a particular realization of the future deviation–namely the
realization that is exactly equal to the judgment in quarter 0–as well as the resulting realizations
over time of inﬂation, the output gap, the instrument rate, and the real interest rate. Clearly, the
probability of the future realizations of the deviation being exactly equal to the previous judgment
is generally zero.
Panel a shows that, when the central bank expects a 1 percentage-point inﬂation deviation in
quarter 6, it chooses an optimal instrument-rate projection such that the instrument rate is raised
to about 1 percentage point during the ﬁrst few quarters and then gradually lowered back to its
steady-state level. As a result, the projected output gap gradually falls to about −0.5 percentage
in quarter 7 and then very gradually rises back towards zero. The inﬂation projection shows
inﬂation falling slightly before it is hit by the inﬂation-deviation in quarter 6, then rising to almost
1 percentage point, and ﬁnally falling back towards its steady-state level after quarter 6. Thus,
the optimal policy projection is a clear example of preemptive monetary policy: The instrument
rate is raised and the output gap is reduced well before the expected inﬂation-deviation shock, so
as to eﬃciently control inﬂation and bring it back to target after the shock. The optimal policy
projection in quarter 0 results in an intertemporal loss of 2.1 units.35 In the second interpretation,
when panel a shows the actual realization of the deviation, the accumulated realized loss over time,
discounted to quarter 0, is also the same 2.1 units (since δ =1 , the discounting does not aﬀect the
loss).
Panel b shows the time series of the variables for the same particular realization of the future
deviations when the inﬂation deviation equals 1 percentage point in quarter 6 and is zero elsewhere.
However, in this panel, the central bank in each quarter disregards judgment, while still responding
optimally to the predetermined variables. That is, the central bank responds in the same way to the
predetermined variables as for the optimal policy, but it does not respond to any expected future
deviation. It behaves as if it believes that the deviation is a serially uncorrelated zero-mean process,
35 Given how the target variables are measured, with the loss function (5.3) and δ =1 ,a ne x p e c t e dd i ﬀerence of
inﬂation from target of one (two) annualized percentage point(s) for a single quarter gives rise to an intertemporal
loss of one (four) units.
34so its expected future deviations are zero. This corresponds to a commitment to the instrument
rule (4.2) (recall that there is no optimal response to Lagrange multipliers or lagged predetermined
variables for the backward-looking model). The central bank then keeps the instrument rate at
its steady-state level through quarter 5. Accordingly, inﬂation and the output gap stay at the
steady-state levels through quarter 5. In quarter 6, the inﬂation shock hits and inﬂation jumps to
1 percentage point, while the predetermined output gap still stays at zero. In this situation, once
the inﬂation shock has hit, the optimal monetary-policy response is to raise the instrument rate
substantially, to more than 1.5 percentage points above the steady-state level during the following
few quarters. This reduces the output gap to almost −0.5 percentage points during the next 8—9
quarters. The instrument rate is gradually lowered back to the steady-state level, and inﬂation
and the output gap return to their steady-state levels very slowly. The absence of any preemption
requires a larger instrument-rate response when the shock occurs, the output-gap is nevertheless
reduced with a considerable lag, and inﬂation stays above target for a long time. The resulting loss
intertemporal is 3.2, 1.1 units higher than when monetary policy relies on judgment.
Panel c is analogous to panel a, except that it shows a situation when the central bank’s
judgment in quarter 0, z0, is such that the central bank expects an output-gap deviation of 1
percentage point in quarter 6, whereas no other deviations are expected. The expected output-
gap deviation, zy, is denoted by circle markers with no connecting line. Again, panel c has two
interpretations; the ﬁrst is that the panel just shows the judgment and optimal policy projection in
quarter 0; the second is that is also shows the time series of the variables if the future realizations
of the output-gap deviation are exactly equal to the judgment in quarter 0. For this expected
output-gap deviation, the optimal policy projection shows a substantial increase in the instrument
rate to almost 2 percentage points above the steady-state level in quarter 3—5 and then a rather
quick reduction back to the steady-state level. As a result, the output-gap projection shows output
falling by almost −0.5 percentage points before the expected output-gap deviation hits, after which
it rises to less than 0.5 percentage points and then relatively quickly comes back to the steady-level.
The resulting movements in the inﬂation projection are small. A modest loss of 0.51 units results
from this preemptive optimal policy projection.
Panel d is analogous to panel b, except that it shows the time series of the variables for the
particular realization of the output-gap deviation when it equals 1 percentage-point in quarter 6 and
is zero in other quarter. The central bank disregards judgment and only responds to current and
lagged inﬂation and the output gap (although again optimally so, according to the instrument rule
35(4.2)). Then the central bank keeps the instrument rate at its steady-state level until the output-gap
shock hits in quarter 6. Once the shock has hit, it is optimal to raise the instrument rate even more,
to more than 2 percentage points for a few quarters, before it is lowered back to the steady-state
level. The output gap stays up around 1 percentage point for several quarters. This causes inﬂation
to rise and only very slowly return to target. The output gap has to undershoot the steady-state
level signiﬁcantly in order to bring inﬂation back. Clearly, inﬂation and the output gap deviate
substantially more than when the central bank uses its judgment. The resulting intertemporal loss
is 3.1, 2.6 units higher than the loss for the optimal policy projection with judgment.
This example shows a substantial diﬀerence between monetary policy with and without judg-
ment, with substantial diﬀerences in the development of the target variables and corresponding
intertemporal losses.
5.2. Forward-looking model
The forward-looking New Keynesian model of Lindé [13] has two equations. I use the following
parameter estimates,
πt =0 .457πt+1|t +( 1− 0.457)πt−1 +0 .048yt + zπt,
yt =0 .425yt+1|t +( 1− 0.425)yt−1 − 0.156(it − πt+1|t)+zyt.
The variables are measured as for the backward-looking model. The predetermined variables are
(πt−1,y t−1,i t−1,z πt,z yt) (the lagged instrument rate enters because it enters into the loss function,
and the two deviations are entered in order to write the model on the form (2.1), see section 2).
The forward-looking variables are (πt,y t). See appendix I for details. The loss function and its
parameters used in the experiment below are the same as for the backward-looking model.36
Figure 5.2, panel a-d, shows the same experiments as ﬁgure 5.1, but for the forward-looking
model. Thus, before quarter 0, the variables are equal to their steady-state levels, zero, and the
central bank does not expect any future inﬂation and output-gap deviations.
In panel a, in quarter 0, while the inﬂation and the output-gap deviations in that quarter
are still zero, the central bank’s judgment, z0, changes, such that the central bank expects an
inﬂation deviation equal to 1 percentage point in quarter 6, whereas it still expects zero inﬂation
deviations for all other quarters and zero output-gap deviations for all quarters. Again, behind these
36 I ﬁnd it very unrealistic to consider inﬂation and output in the current quarter as forward-looking variables. I
believe it makes more sense to have current inﬂation and the output gap predetermined, and to have one-quarter-
ahead inﬂation, output-gap, and instrument-rate plans be determined by the model above. Such a variant of the
newkeynesian model is used in Svensson and Woodford [30] and Svensson [25].
36Figure 5.2: Monetary policy with and without judgment: Forward-looking model
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expected deviation could be a probability distribution Φ0 corresponding to substantial uncertainty.
As above, panel a has two interpretations. In the ﬁrst interpretation, it just shows the judgment
z0 and the optimal policy projection (ˆ π0, ˆ y0,ˆ ı0, ˆ r0). In the second interpretation, it shows the
time series of inﬂation, the output-gap, the instrument rate, and the real interest rate, for the
particular realizations of the future deviations that are exactly equal to the central-bank’s judgment
in quarter 0. In this interpretation, I also assume that the private sector has suﬃcient information–
cf. the discussion in section 2.1–to form expectations consistent with the optimal policy projection.
The optimal policy projection in panel a shows that the central bank plans to raise the instru-
ment rate to about 2 percentage points above the steady-state level in the quarters before and
including the time of the inﬂation shock. This makes the output-gap projection fall to more than
−2 percentage points at the time of the expected inﬂation deviation. The inﬂa t i o np r o j e c t i o nr i s e s
before and up to the expected inﬂation deviation, because private-sector expectations are forward-
looking and consistent with the optimal inﬂation projection. After the expected inﬂation deviation,
the instrument rate, the output gap, and inﬂation are projected to return to their steady-state lev-
37els. Again, there is a considerable amount of preemption in the optimal policy with judgment,
with a projected positive real interest rate and negative output gap before the expected inﬂation
deviation. A substantial intertemporal loss of 25 units results from the optimal policy projection.
Panel b shows the realizations over time of these variables when the realizations of the inﬂation
deviation is equal to 1 percentage point in quarter 6 and zero in other quarters and the central
bank in each quarter disregards judgment while still responding optimally to current and lagged
inﬂation and output gap. In this case, the central bank is assumed to respond optimally to both
the predetermined variables and the lagged predetermined variables, as if the central bank had
committed itself to the optimal policy under commitment while ignoring its judgment. Hence,
the central bank behaves according to instrument rule (4.3) and responds optimally to the current
deviation but expects zero future deviations. However, the private sector is assumed to have rational
expectations of the future inﬂation shock. These expectations will increase inﬂation to more than 4
percentage points at the time of the inﬂation shock. The central bank’s optimal response to current
and predetermined variables induces it to raise the instrument rate in line with inﬂation, but it
is nevertheless behind the curve in the sense that the real interest rate becomes negative and the
output gap becomes positive in the ﬁrst few quarters. The central bank’s response eventually leads
to a high positive real interest rate, a negative output gap, and a fall in inﬂation. In comparison
with panel a, inﬂation rises earlier and more, and the output gap falls later, than under the optimal
monetary policy with judgment. The intertemporal loss is 54, a substantial increase of 29 units
above the loss for monetary policy with judgment.
Panel c shows the situation where the central bank’s judgment in quarter 0 is such that it
expects an output-gap deviation of 1 percentage point in quarter 6 and otherwise zero deviations.
The optimal policy projection, taking this judgment into account, is to raise the instrument rate
before the expected output-gap deviation, which moderates the expected impact on the output
gap. The inﬂation projection remains very ﬂat, and the projections of the real interest rate and
the instrument rate are almost identical. The resulting intertemporal loss is small, 0.56.
Panel d shows the realizations over time of the variables in the situation where the realization
of the output-gap deviation is 1 percentage point in quarter 6 and zero in other quarters and the
central bank disregards judgment and only responds to current and lagged predetermined variables,
although again optimally so, corresponding to the instrument rule (4.3). In comparison with the
second interpretation of panel c, when the panel shows the actual realization of the variables for
the same realization of the deviations, the central bank ends up raising the instrument rate later
38Figure 5.3: Monetary policy with Taylor rules: Forward-looking model
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and more, and there is more movement in both the output gap and inﬂation. The intertemporal
loss is 1.9, 1.3 units above the loss for optimal policy under judgment.
Again, there are substantial diﬀerences between monetary policy with and without judgment
and corresponding intertemporal losses.
5.2.1. Taylor rules
I also examine two variants of Taylor rules for the forward-looking model, an explicit instrument
rule for which the instrument rate responds to lagged inﬂation and the output gap,
it =1 .5πt−1 +0 .5yt−1,
and an implicit instrument rule for which the instrument rate responds to the forward-looking
current inﬂation and output,
it =1 .5πt +0 .5yt.
39As noted in section 4, the implementation of an implicit instrument rule is somewhat complex. I
disregard these complications here, and just assume that it is somehow implemented. Figure 5.3
shows the realizations over time of the variables when the central bank implementing the two Taylor
r u l e sf o rt h et w oc a s e so fe i t h e ra ni n ﬂation deviation or an output-gap deviation only in quarter 6.
Panels a and b show the result of the explicit and implicit Taylor rule, respectively, when
there is an inﬂation deviation in quarter 6 and the private sector has rational expectations of that
deviation. The resulting intertemporal losses are substantial, 43 and 38, respectively–18 and 13
units, respectively, above the loss for optimal monetary policy with judgment, 25. Interestingly, the
intertemporal loss with either of the two Taylor rules is less than the policy without judgment that
responds optimally to current and lagged predetermined variables, panel b in ﬁgure 5.2, which has
an intertemporal loss of 54. One possible interpretation of this is that history dependence in the
form of responding to the Lagrange multipliers is not always advantageous, when these multipliers
do not take into account the expected future deviations. The loss for the implicit Taylor rule is
lower than for the explicit one. One interpretation is that the implicit Taylor rule takes private-
sector expectations better into account, and therefore indirectly takes the expected future deviation
better into account.
Panels c and d show the result of the two Taylor rules when there is an output-gap deviation
in quarter 6. Here, the intertemporal loss is substantially higher than the small loss for monetary
policy without judgment in panel d of ﬁgure 5.2. In this case, the optimal response to current and
lagged predetermined variables does much better than the two Taylor rules.
I conclude that the two Taylor rules perform considerably worse than the optimal policy with
judgment, especially when there are expected future output-gap deviations.
6. Conclusions
The decision process of modern monetary policy that can be called “forecast targeting”–ﬁnding
a projection of the current and future instrument rate such that the projection paths of the target
variables “look good” relative to the central bank’s objectives–is formalized in this paper as a
technique that provides projections of the instrument rate and the target variables that minimize
an intertemporal loss function. The paper shows how this technique can easily incorporate central-
bank judgment, a necessary ingredient in modern monetary policy. In two empirical models of the
U.S. economy, a few examples are shown in which forecast targeting that incorporates judgment
provides signiﬁcantly better monetary-policy performance than a policy that follows an instrument
40rule and disregards judgment. The paper shows how the policy problem, normally treated as an
inﬁnite-horizon problem, can be reformulated as a convenient ﬁnite-horizon decision problem, which
is either an exact or a very close approximation to the inﬁnite-horizon problem. This approximation
makes the policy problem much easier to handle numerically. The paper also shows how the time-
consistency problem can be easily managed and the resulting projections made to be optimal under
commitment in a timeless perspective. In particular, the paper shows that it is not necessary to
be explicit about the underlying complex reduced-form reaction function of monetary policy. The
policymakers only need to ponder the projections of the target variables and the instrument rate
under alternative assumptions, and these projections can be presented as graphs.
Several of the ideas and techniques presented here are already applied to various extents by
diﬀerent central banks. I hope the presentation here will be useful for attempts to apply them
more extensively and systematically.
If policymakers hesitate to make the parameters of their loss function explicit (for instance, the
weight on output-gap stabilization relative to inﬂation stabilization), the techniques presented here
can still be very useful. For instance, the policymakers can ask the staﬀ to provide optimal policy
projections of the target variables for a range of loss-function parameters. These projections then
provide one way to illustrate the available tradeoﬀs among the target variables, the set of feasible
projections of the target variables from which the policy makers should choose their optimal policy
projection.
The framework used here is one where mean projections are suﬃcient for optimal decisions,
what can be called mean forecast targeting, which is suﬃcient under the assumptions that result in
certainty equivalence. If these assumptions are not satisﬁed, the principal ideas in this paper can
be extended to a situation when the projections are probability distributions rather than means,
and the intertemporal losses can be computed by numerical integration over those distributions.
This I have previously called distribution forecast targeting (Svensson [23]). The details in such an
undertaking remain to be completed, and the practical diﬀerences between mean and distribution
forecast targeting remain to be clariﬁed. Svensson and Williams [32] examines distribution forecast
targeting in a situation when where genuine model uncertainty implies that certainty equivalence
does not hold.
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A. Optimal policy under commitment with the deviation being an arbitrary sto-
chastic process
Let the model equations for t ≥ 0 be (2.1). A common special case is when the matrix C = I, but
in general C need not be invertible. This system can be written
˜ C
⎡
⎣
Xt+1
Etxt+1
Etit+1
⎤
⎦ = ˜ A
⎡
⎣
Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦ +
∙
zt+1
0
¸
, (A.1)
where Etqt+τ ≡
R
qt+τdΦt(ζt) for any variable qt+τ (τ ≥ 0), the matrices ˜ A and ˜ C are of dimension
(nX + nx) × (nX + nx + ni) and given by
˜ A ≡
£
AB
¤
≡
∙
A11 A12 B1
A21 A22 B2
¸
, ˜ C ≡
∙
I 00
0 C 0
¸
.
where A and B are partitioned according to (2.3).
The target variables are deﬁned by (2.5). The intertemporal loss function in period 0 is
E0
∞ X
t=0
δtLt,
1where the period loss function, (2.7), can be written as
Lt =
1
2
£
X0
t x0
t i0
t
¤
D0WD
⎡
⎣
Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦.
Consider minimizing this intertemporal loss function under once-and-for-all commitment in period
t =0 ,f o rg i v e nX0 = ¯ X0. For convergence, when the variance of zt+1 is nonzero, I need 0 <δ<1.
Variants of this problem are solved in Backus and Driﬃll [2], Currie and Levine [5], and Söderlind
[20], when the deviation is an iid shock. The focus here is on the case when the deviation is an
arbitrary stochastic process.
Construct the Lagrangian,
L0 =E 0
∞ X
t=0
δt
⎧
⎨
⎩
Lt +
£
ξ0
t+1 Ξ0
t
¤
⎛
⎝ ˜ C
⎡
⎣
Xt+1
Etxt+1
Etit+1
⎤
⎦ − ˜ A
⎡
⎣
Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦ −
∙
zt+1
0
¸⎞
⎠
⎫
⎬
⎭
+ξ0
0(X0 − ¯ X0)/δ
=E 0
∞ X
t=0
δt
⎧
⎨
⎩
Lt +
£
ξ0
t+1 Ξ0
t
¤
⎛
⎝ ˜ C
⎡
⎣
Xt+1
xt+1
it+1
⎤
⎦ − ˜ A
⎡
⎣
Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦ −
∙
zt+1
0
¸⎞
⎠
⎫
⎬
⎭
+ξ0
0(X0 − ¯ X0)/δ,
where ξt+1 and Ξt are vectors of nX and nx Lagrange multipliers of the upper and lower block,
respectively, of (A.1). The law of iterated expectations has been used in the second equality,
E0Et =E 0 for t ≥ 0.N o t et h a tΞt is dated to emphasize that it depends on information available
in period t.
For t ≥ 1,t h eﬁrst-order conditions with respect to Xt, xt and it can be written
£
X0
t x0
t i0
t
¤
D0WD+
£
ξ0
t Ξ0
t−1
¤ 1
δ
˜ C −
£
Etξ0
t+1 Ξ0
t
¤ ˜ A =0 . (A.2)
For t =0 ,t h eﬁrst-order condition with respect to X0, x0,a n di0 can be written
£
X0
t x0
t i0
t
¤
D0WD+
£
ξ0
t 0
¤ 1
δ
˜ C −
£
Etξ0
t+1 Ξ0
t
¤ ˜ A =0 , (A.3)
where X0 = ¯ X0. In comparison with (A.2), a vector of zeros enters in place of Ξ−1, since there is
no constraint corresponding to the lower block of (A.1) for t = −1. By including a ﬁctitious vector
of Lagrange multipliers, Ξ−1, equal to zero,
Ξ−1 =0 ,( A . 4 )
in (A.3), I can write the ﬁrst-order conditions more compactly as (A.2) for t ≥ 0 and (A.4).
2The system of diﬀerence equations (A.2) has nX + nx + ni equations. The ﬁrst nX equations
can be associated with the Lagrange multipliers ξt. Indeed, −ξt/δ can be interpreted as the total
marginal losses in period t of the predetermined variables Xt (for t =0 , with given X0, the equa-
tions determine ξ0). They are forward-looking variables: Lagrange multipliers for predetermined
variables are always forward-looking, whereas the Lagrange multipliers for the (equations for the)
forward-looking variables are predetermined. The middle nx equations are associated with the La-
grange multipliers Ξt. Indeed, ΞtA22 can be interpreted as the total marginal losses in period t of
the forward-looking variables, xt.A l s o ,ΞtC can be seen as the marginal loss in period t of expec-
tations Etxt+1 of the forward-looking variables. The last ni equations are the ﬁrst-order equations
for the vector of instruments. In the special case when the lower right ni ×ni submatrix of D0WD
is of full rank, the instruments can be solved in terms of the other variables and eliminated from
(A.2), leaving the ﬁrst nX +nx equations involving the Lagrange multipliers and the predetermined
and forward-looking variables only.
Rewrite the nX + nx + ni ﬁrst-order conditions as
˜ A0
∙
Etξt+1
Ξt
¸
= D0WD
⎡
⎣
Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦ +
1
δ
˜ C0
∙
ξt
Ξt−1
¸
. (A.5)
They can be combined with the model equations (A.1) to get a system of 2(nX +nx)+ni diﬀerence
equations for t ≥ 0,
∙ ˜ C 0
0 ˜ A0
¸
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎣
Xt+1
Etxt+1
Etit+1
Etξt+1
Ξt
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎦
=
∙ ˜ A 0
D0WD 1
δ ˜ C0
¸
⎡
⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎣
Xt
xt
it
ξt
Ξt−1
⎤
⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎦
+
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣
zt+1
0
0
0
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦. (A.6)
Here, Xt and Ξt are predetermined variables, and xt, it,a n dξt are non-predetermined variables.
This can be rearranged as the system
C
∙
y1,t+1
Ety2,t+1
¸
= M
∙
y1t
y2t
¸
+
⎡
⎣
∙
zt+1
0
¸
0
⎤
⎦,
where
C ≡
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
I 00 00
00C 00
0 A0
21 00A0
11
0 A0
22 00A0
12
0 B0
2 00B0
1
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
, (A.7)
y1t ≡
∙
Xt
Ξt−1
¸
,y 2t ≡
⎡
⎣
xt
it
ξt
⎤
⎦.
3Thus, y1t is a vector of m1 ≡ nX + nx predetermined variables, and y2t is a vector of m2 ≡
nx + ni + nX non-predetermined variables.
Under suitable assumptions (see appendix B), such a system has a unique solution, which can
be written
y2t = F1y1t + Zt (A.8)
y1,t+1 = M1y1t + NEtZt+1 + PEtzt+1 +
∙
zt+1 − Etzt+1
0
¸
, (A.9)
where Zt is an m2-dimensional stochastic process given by
Zt ≡
∞ X
τ=0
RτEtzt+1+τ ≡ Rzt, (A.10)
where I can interpret R as a linear operator on zt ≡ Et(z0
t+1,z0
t+2,...)0.
In terms of the original variables, the solution for t ≥ 0,g i v e nX0 and Ξ−1 =0 ,c a nb ew r i t t e n
⎡
⎣
xt
it
ξt
⎤
⎦ = F1
∙
Xt
Ξt−1
¸
+ Rzt
≡ F
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1
⎤
⎦, (A.11)
∙
Xt+1
Ξt
¸
= M1
∙
Xt
Ξt−1
¸
+ NREtzt+1 + PEtzt+1 +
∙
zt+1 − Etzt+1
0
¸
≡ M
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1
⎤
⎦ +
∙
zt+1 − Etzt+1
0
¸
, (A.12)
where F and M are linear operators. The details of the solution are derived in appendix B. The
matrices F1, M1, N, P,a n d{Rτ}∞
τ=0–and thereby the linear operators M and F–depend on A, B,
C, D, W,a n dδ, but are independent of the second and higher moments of the exogenous stochastic
process {zt}∞
t=1. This demonstrates the certainty equivalence of the commitment solution.37
If the commitment is once and for all and starts in period 0, Ξ−1 =0 . Commitment in a timeless
perspective can be seen as corresponding to a situation where the lower block of (A.12) is restricted
to apply also for previous periods. Then, Ξt−1 is determined by
Ξt−1 = M121Xt−1 + M122Ξt−2 + N2Et−1Zt + P2Et−1zt
=
∞ X
τ=0
M122
τ(M121Xt−1−τ + N2Et−1−τZt−τ + P2Et−1−τzt−τ),
37 The middle block of (A.11) is the optimal explicit instrument rule for this problem, the instrument written as
a function of predetermined and exogenous variables. Eliminating the Lagrange multipliers from (A.2) results in
the optimal targeting rule for this problem, a consolidated optimal ﬁrst-order condition for the target variables. See
Svensson [25] on instrument and targeting rules, as well as the lecture notes Svensson [A7].
4where M1, N,a n dP are partitioned conformably with Xt and Ξt−1.
Alternatively, the commitment in a timeless perspective can be generated as optimization under
commitment or discretion with a term added to the intertemporal loss function in period 0,
E0
∞ X
t=0
δtLt + Ξ−1
1
δ
Cx0,
where Ξ−1 is the Lagrange multiplier for the block of forward-looking equations from the optimiza-
tion in period −1 (see Svensson and Woodford [30] and Svensson [25]).
In the standard case, when zt is a vector of iid zero-mean shocks, I have Etzt+1 ≡ 0, Zt ≡
EtZt+1 ≡ 0,a n dzt ≡ 0. Thus, the terms involving Zt in (A.11) and (A.12) vanish.38 Consequently,
the eﬀect of zt being an arbitrary exogenous stochastic process shows up only in the addition of the
terms involving Zt and the corresponding matrices N, P,a n d{Rτ}∞
τ=0. Then, I can set M ≡ M1
and F ≡ F1,a n d
y1,t+1 = My1t + zt+1.
Let Σ denote the variance-covariance matrix of the iid shocks zt+1.D e ﬁne the matrices ¯ D and ¯ W
according to
Yt = D
⎡
⎣
Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦ = D
⎡
⎣
I 0
F11 F12
F21 F22
⎤
⎦y1t ≡ ¯ Dy1t,
Lt =
1
2
Y 0
tWYt =
1
2
y0
1t ¯ D0W ¯ Dy1t ≡
1
2
y0
1t ¯ Wy1t,
where ¯ W is symmetric and positive semideﬁnite. Then twice the minimum loss in period t will
satisfy
y0
1tVy 1t + w =E t
∞ X
τ=0
δτy0
1,t+τ ¯ Wy1,t+τ
= y0
1t ¯ Wy1t +E t
∞ X
τ=1
δτy0
1,t+τ ¯ Wy1,t+τ
= y0
1t ¯ Wy1t + δEtEt+1
∞ X
τ=0
δτy0
1,t+1+τ ¯ Wy1,t+1+τ
= y0
1t ¯ Wy1t + δEt(y0
1,t+1Vy 1,t+1 + w)
= y0
1t ¯ Wy1t + δ(y0
1tM0VMy 1t +E tz0
1,t+1Vz 1,t+1 + w)
= y0
1t ¯ Wy1t + δy0
1tM0VMy 1t + δtrace(V Σ)+δw.
38 In the case when {zt} is an autoregressive process and can be written zt+1 = Ψzt + εt+1,w h e r eΨ is a matrix
and εt an iid zero-mean process, zt can simply be included among the predetermined variable.
5It follows that
w =
δ
1 − δ
trace(V Σ),
and that the matrix V satisﬁes the Lyapunov equation
V = ¯ W + δM0VM. (A.13)
It follows that when trace(V Σ) is nonzero, I must have δ<1 for the existence of an ﬁnite w.
I can use the relations vec(A + B)=vec(A) + vec(B) and vec(ABC)=( C0 ⊗ A) vec(B) on
(A.13) (where vec(A) denotes the vector of stacked column vectors of the matrix A,a n d⊗ denotes
the Kronecker product) which results in
vec(V ) = vec( ¯ W)+δvec
¡
M0VM
¢
= vec( ¯ W)+δ
¡
M0 ⊗ M0¢
vec(V ).
Solving for vec(V ) gives
vec(V )=
£
I − δ
¡
M0 ⊗ M0¢¤−1 vec( ¯ W). (A.14)
A.1. No forward-looking variables
If there are no forward-looking variables, so nx =0 ,Ih a v e
˜ C
∙
Xt+1
Etit+1
¸
= ˜ A
∙
Xt
it
¸
+ zt+1, (A.15)
where the matrices ˜ A and ˜ C are of dimension nX × (nX + ni) and given by
˜ A ≡
£
AB
¤
, ˜ C ≡
£
I 0
¤
.
The period loss function is
Lt =
1
2
Y 0
tWYt ≡
1
2
£
X0
t i0
t
¤
D0WD
∙
Xt
it
¸
.
The nX + ni ﬁrst-order conditions can be written
˜ A0Etξt+1 = D0WD
∙
Xt
it
¸
+
1
δ
˜ C0ξt. (A.16)
Combined with the model equations, I get a system of 2nX + ni diﬀerence equations for t ≥ 0,
∙ ˜ C 0
0 ˜ A0
¸⎡
⎣
Xt+1
Etit+1
Etξt+1
⎤
⎦ =
∙ ˜ A 0
D0WD 1
δ ˜ C0
¸⎡
⎣
Xt
it
ξt
⎤
⎦ +
∙
zt+1
0
¸
.
6Here, Xt are predetermined variables, and it and ξt are non-predetermined variables.
Under suitable assumptions, this system will have a unique solution for t ≥ 0,g i v e nX0,w h i c h
can be written
∙
it
ξt
¸
= F1Xt + Rzt,
Xt+1 = M1Xt + N0Rzt + zt+1.
When there are no forward-looking variables, Xt+1 is directly determined by Xt, it,a n dzt+1
according to (2.1), so M1 and N0 are determined by A, B,a n dF1 as
M1 ≡ A + BFi,
N0 ≡ [B 0],
where
F1 ≡
∙
Fi
Fξ
¸
is partitioned conformably with it and ξt. In comparison with the general solution of (A.9), for the
backward-looking case,
N0Rzt ≡ NREtzt+1 +( P − I)Etzt+1.
B. The solution of a system of diﬀerence equations with the deviation
In order to understand the term in the solution (A.10) and (A.11) that corresponds to the deviation,
consider the system
C
∙
y1,t+1
Ety2,t+1
¸
= M
∙
y1t
y2t
¸
+
∙
θt+1
0
¸
(B.1)
for t ≥ 0; where y1t is a vector of m1 predetermined variables (y1t ≡ (X0
t,Ξ0
t−1)0 and m1 = nX +nx
in the previous section); y2t is a vector of m2 non-predetermined variables (y2t ≡ (x0
t,i 0
t,ξ0
t)0 and
m2 = nx +ni +nX in the previous section); θt is an m1-vector of stochastic processes (θt ≡ (z0
t,00)0
in the previous section); and y10 is given.
By deﬁning the m2-vector of endogenous expectation errors, ηt,a s
ηt ≡ y2t − Ety2t,
(B.1) can be written in the form used in Sims [A6],
Γ0yt = Γ1yt−1 + Ψθt + Πηt,
7where yt ≡ (y0
1t,y0
2t)0. Sims shows that, under suitable assumptions, this system has a unique
solution of the form
yt = Θ1yt−1 + Θ0θt + Θy
∞ X
τ=0
Θτ
fΘθEtθt+1+τ,
where Θ0 and Θ1 are real matrices, Θy, Θf,a n dΘθ are complex matrices, and ΘyΘτ
fΘθ for any
integer τ ≥ 0 is a real matrix. These matrices can be calculated by his Matlab program Gensys,
available at www.princeton.edu/∼sims. An advantage with Sims’s approach is that one need not
keep track of what variables are predetermined or nonpredetermined. An arguable disadvantage is
that the determination of the expectational errors is somewhat complex.
Here, I prefer to keep close track of what variables are predetermined and nonpredetermined
and therefore choose to derive the solution to (B.1) following a route closer to Klein [A4] than
Sims [A6], but going beyond Klein in, as Sims, explicitly treating the case of θt being an arbitrary
stochastic process rather than an autoregressive process. The solution will then be of the form
y2t = F1y1t + Zt,
y1,t+1 = M1y1t + NEtZt+1 + PEtθt+1 +( θt+1 − Etθt+1),
Zt ≡
∞ X
τ=0
RτEtθt+1+τ,
where F1, M1, N, P,a n dRτ are real matrices to be determined.
Take the expectation conditional on information in period t and write the system as
C
∙
Ety1,t+1
Ety2,t+1
¸
= M
∙
y1t
y2t
¸
+
∙
Etθt+1
0
¸
. (B.2)
Following Klein [A4], Sims [A6], and Söderlind [20], I use the generalized Schur decomposition.
This decomposition results in the square complex matrices Q, S, T,a n dZ such that
C = Q0SZ0, (B.3)
M = Q0TZ0, (B.4)
where Z0 for a complex matrix denotes the complex conjugate transpose of Z (the transpose of the
complex conjugate of Z).39 The matrices Q and Z are unitary (Q0Q = Z0Z = I), and S and T
are upper triangular (see Golub and van Loan [A2]). The decomposition is furthermore ordered so
the block consisting of the stable generalized eigenvalues (the jth diagonal element of T divided
39 Let the elements of the complex matrix Z be denoted zjk ≡ Re(zjk)+iIm(zjk). Then the complex conjugate of
the matrix Z is the matrix of elements ¯ zjk ≡ Re(zjk) − iIm(zjk).
8by the jth diagonal element of S, λj ≡ tjj/sjj)c o m e sﬁrst and the block of unstable generalized
eigenvalues comes last.40
More precisely, I assume the saddle-point property emphasized by Blanchard and Kahn [A1]:
The number of eigenvalues with modulus larger than unity equals the number of nonpredetermined
variables. Thus, I assume that |λj| > 1 for m1 +1≤ j ≤ m1 +m2 and |λj| < 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ m1 (for
an exogenous predetermined variable with a unit root, I can actually allow |λj| =1for some 1 ≤ j
≤ m1).
Deﬁne ∙
˜ y1t
˜ y2t
¸
≡ Z0
∙
y1t
y2t
¸
. (B.5)
Ic a ni n t e r p r e t˜ y1t as a complex vector of m1 transformed predetermined variables and ˜ y2t as a
complex vector of m2 transformed non-predetermined variables. Premultiply the system (B.2) by
Q and use (B.3)-(B.5) to write it as
∙
S11 S12
0 S22
¸∙
Et˜ y1,t+1
Et˜ y2,t+1
¸
=
∙
T11 T12
0 T22
¸∙
˜ y1t
˜ y2t
¸
+
∙
Q11
Q21
¸
Etθt+1, (B.6)
where S, T,a n dQ have been partitioned conformably with ˜ y1t and ˜ y2t.
Consider the lower block of (B.6),
S22 Et˜ y2,t+1 = T22 ˜ y2t + Q21Etθt+1. (B.7)
Since the diagonal terms of S22 and T22 (sjj and tjj for m1+1≤ j ≤ m1+m2) satisfy |tjj/sjj| > 1,
the diagonal terms of T22 are nonzero, the determinant of T22 is nonzero, and T22 is invertible. Note
that S22 m a yn o tb ei n v e r t i b l e .Ic a nt h e ns o l v ef o r˜ y2t as
˜ y2t = JEt˜ y2,t+1 + KEtθt+1 (B.8)
=
∞ X
τ=0
JτKEtθt+1+τ (B.9)
for t ≥ 0, where the complex matrices J and K (m2 ×m2 and m2 ×m1, respectively) are given by
J ≡ T−1
22 S22, (B.10)
K ≡− T−1
22 Q21. (B.11)
Here, I have exploited that the modulus of the diagonal terms of T−1
22 S22 is less than one. I also
assume that Et˜ y2,t+τ and Etθt+τ are suﬃciently bounded. Then JτEt˜ y2,t+τ → 0 when τ →∞ ,a n d
40 The sorting of the eigenvalues is often done by two programs written by Sims and available at
www.princeton.edu/∼sims, Qzdiv and Qzswitch.
9the inﬁnite sum on the right side converges. Note that J may not be invertible, since S22 may not
be invertible.
I have, by (B.5),
y1t = Z11˜ y1t + Z12˜ y2t, (B.12)
y2t = Z21˜ y1t + Z22˜ y2t, (B.13)
where
Z ≡
∙
Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
¸
(B.14)
is partitioned conformably with y1t and y2t. Under the assumption of the saddle-point property,
Z11 is square. I furthermore assume that Z11 is invertible.T h e nIc a ns o l v ef o r˜ y1t in (B.12),
˜ y1t = Z−1
11 y1t − Z−1
11 Z12˜ y2t, (B.15)
and use this in (B.13) to get
y2t = F1y1t + H˜ y2t, (B.16)
where the real m2 × m1 matrix F1 and the complex m2 × m2 matrix H are given by
F1 ≡ Z21Z−1
11 , (B.17)
H ≡ Z22 − Z21Z−1
11 Z12. (B.18)
I will show below that H is invertible.
By (B.9) and (B.16), I can then write the solution of y2t as
y2t = F1y1t + Zt, (B.19)
where Zt is a real exogenous m2-vector stochastic process (not to be confused with the unitary
matrix Z in the Schur decomposition) given by
Zt ≡ H˜ y2t ≡
∞ X
τ=0
RτEtθt+1+τ, (B.20)
Rτ ≡ HJτK (τ ≥ 0), (B.21)
where the matrices Rτ are real.
I note that the complex conjugate transpose of Z, Z0,s a t i s ﬁes
Z0 ≡
∙
Z0
11 Z0
21
Z0
12 Z0
22
¸
, (B.22)
10where the submatrices are given by (B.14). Since Z0Z = ZZ0 = I,Ih a v e
∙
Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
¸∙
Z0
11 Z0
21
Z0
12 Z0
22
¸
=
∙
Z11Z0
11 + Z12Z0
12 Z11Z0
21 + Z12Z0
22
Z21Z0
11 + Z22Z0
12 Z21Z0
21 + Z22Z0
22
¸
=
∙
I 0
0 I
¸
, (B.23)
By (B.22), I can write
˜ y2t = Z0
12y1t + Z0
22y2t.
Using this in (B.16) gives
y2t = F1y1t + H(Z0
12y1t + Z0
22y2t)
=( F1 + HZ0
12)y1t + HZ0
22y2t.
It follows that
F1 + HZ0
12 =0 , (B.24)
HZ0
22 = I. (B.25)
I can also show (B.24) by using (B.23),
Z21Z−1
11 +( Z22 − Z21Z−1
11 Z12)Z0
12 = Z21Z−1
11 + Z22Z0
12 − Z21Z−1
11 Z12Z0
12
= Z21Z−1
11 + Z22Z0
12 − Z21Z−1
11 (I − Z11Z0
11)
= Z21Z−1
11 + Z22Z0
12 − Z21Z−1
11 + Z21Z0
11
=0 .
Similarly, I can show (B.25) by
(Z22 − Z21Z−1
11 Z12)Z0
22 = Z22Z0
22 − Z21Z−1
11 Z12Z0
22
= Z22Z0
22 − Z21Z−1
11 (−Z11Z0
21)
= Z22Z0
22 + Z21Z0
21
= I.
It follows from (B.25) that H is invertible and that its inverse is given by
H−1 = Z0
22. (B.26)
It remains to ﬁnd a solution for y1,t+1. The upper block of (B.6) is
S11Et˜ y1,t+1 + S12Et˜ y2,t+1 = T11˜ y1t + T12˜ y2t + Q11Etθt+1.
11Since the diagonal terms of S11 and T11 satisfy |tjj/sjj| < 1, all diagonal terms of S11 must be
nonzero, so the determinant of S11 is nonzero, and S11 is invertible. I can then solve for Et˜ y1,t+1 as
Et˜ y1,t+1 = S−1
11 (T11˜ y1t + T12˜ y2t) − S−1
11 S12Et˜ y2,t+1 + S−1
11 Q11Etθt+1.
By (B.12),
Ety1,t+1 = Z11Et˜ y1,t+1 + Z12Et˜ y2,t+1
= Z11[S−1
11 (T11˜ y1t + T12˜ y2t) − S−1
11 S12Et˜ y2,t+1 + S−1
11 Q11Etθt+1]+Z12Et˜ y2,t+1
= Z11S−1
11 T11˜ y1t + Z11S−1
11 T12˜ y2t +( Z12 − Z11S−1
11 S12)Et˜ y2,t+1 + Z11S−1
11 Q11Etθt+1
= Z11S−1
11 T11(Z−1
11 y1t − Z−1
11 Z12˜ y2t)+Z11S−1
11 T12˜ y2t +( Z12 − Z11S−1
11 S12)Et˜ y2,t+1
+Z11S−1
11 Q11Etθt+1
= Z11S−1
11 T11Z−1
11 y1t + Z11S−1
11 (T12 − T11Z−1
11 Z12)˜ y2t
+(Z12 − Z11S−1
11 S12)Et˜ y2,t+1 + Z11S−1
11 Q11Etθt+1
= Z11S−1
11 T11Z−1
11 y1t + Z11S−1
11 (T12 − T11Z−1
11 Z12)(JEt˜ y2,t+1 + KEtθt+1)
+(Z12 − Z11S−1
11 S12)Et˜ y2,t+1 + Z11S−1
11 Q11Etθt+1
= Z11S−1
11 T11Z−1
11 y1t
+[Z11S−1
11 (T12 − T11Z−1
11 Z12)J +( Z12 − Z11S−1
11 S12)]Et˜ y2,t+1
+Z11S−1
11 [Q11 +( T12 − T11Z−1
11 Z12)K]Etθt+1, (B.27)
where I have used (B.15) and (B.8).
It follows that I can use (B.27), (B.20), and (B.26) and write the solution as
y1,t+1 = My1t + NEtZt+1 + PEtθt+1 +( θt+1 − Etθt+1), (B.28)
where the real matrices M, N,a n dP are given by
M ≡ Z11S−1
11 T11Z−1
11 , (B.29)
N ≡ [Z11S−1
11 (T12 − T11Z−1
11 Z12)J +( Z12 − Z11S−1
11 S12)]Z0
22, (B.30)
P ≡ Z11S−1
11 [Q11 +( T12 − T11Z−1
11 Z12)K]. (B.31)
Thus, the solution to the system (B.1) is given by (B.19) and (B.28) for t ≥ 0. This results in
the solution (A.11)-(A.12) above, where the matrix P in (A.12) is the submatrix of the ﬁrst nX
rows of the matrix P in (B.31) (since θt+1 ≡ (z0
t+1,00)0).
12C. The model when judgment is a ﬁnite-order moving average
When the deviation is a ﬁnite-order moving-average process and the dynamics of the deviation and
judgment is described by (2.16), the model can be written as
⎡
⎣
Xt+1
zt+1
Cxt+1|t
⎤
⎦ = ¯ A
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
xt
⎤
⎦ + ¯ Bit +
⎡
⎣
εt+1
εt+1
0
⎤
⎦, (C.1)
where the matrices ¯ A and ¯ B are given by
¯ A ≡
⎡
⎣
A11 Az12 A12
0 Az22 0
A21 0 A22
⎤
⎦, ¯ B ≡
⎡
⎣
B1
0
B2
⎤
⎦,
the matrix Az is partitioned conformably with zt and zt as
Az ≡
∙
0 Az12
0 Az22
¸
,
and ˜ εt ≡ (ε0
t,ε t0)0 is zero-mean and iid. Thus, this results in the standard forward-looking linear-
quadratic model, with the predetermined variables being Xt and zt. The optimal policy projection
can then be described as (2.17) and (2.18), where F and M are ﬁnite-dimensional matrices. The
intertemporal loss for the optimal policy projection can then be written as
1
2
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1
⎤
⎦
0
V
⎡
⎣
Xt
zt
Ξt−1,t−1
⎤
⎦,
where the matrix V is the solution to the Lyapunov equation,
V = ¯ W + δM0VM,
the symmetric and positive semideﬁnite matrix ¯ W is deﬁned by
¯ W =
⎡
⎣
I 00
Fx
Fi
⎤
⎦
0
D0WD
⎡
⎣
I 00
Fx
Fi
⎤
⎦,
and the matrix F is partitioned conformably with xt and it as
F ≡
∙
Fx
Fi
¸
.
13D. The Marcet-Marimon method to solve the linear-quadratic optimization prob-
lem with forward-looking variables
Let ¯ Xt ≡ (Xt,zt) and write the model (C.1) as
¯ Xt+1 = ¯ A11 ¯ Xt + ¯ A12xt + ¯ B1it +˜ εt+1, (D.1)
CEtxt+1 = ¯ A21 ¯ Xt + ¯ A22xt + ¯ B2it. (D.2)
Write the period loss function as
Lt =
1
2
⎡
⎣
¯ Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦
0
W0
⎡
⎣
¯ Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦, (D.3)
where the symmetric positive semideﬁnite matrix W0 is deﬁned by
⎡
⎣
¯ Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦
0
W0
⎡
⎣
¯ Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦ ≡
⎡
⎣
Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦
0
D0WD
⎡
⎣
Xt
xt
it
⎤
⎦.
Consider the problem in period 0,
min
{it}t≥0
E0
∞ X
t=0
δtLt, (D.4)
subject to (D.1), (D.2) and X0 given. The minimization is taken to be under commitment.
Marcet and Marimon [14] show that this problem can be reformulated as a recursive saddlepoint
problem,
max
{γt}t≥0
min
{xt,it}t≥0
E0
∞ X
t=0
δt˜ Lt, (D.5)
where the modiﬁed period loss function satisﬁes
˜ Lt ≡ ˜ L( ¯ Xt,Ξt−1;xt,i t,γt)
≡ Lt + L1
t
≡ Lt + γ0
t(− ¯ A21 ¯ Xt − ¯ A22xt − ¯ B2it)+
1
δ
Ξ0
t−1Cxt,
and the optimization is subject to (D.1), to
Ξt = γt, (D.6)
and to X0 and Ξ−1 =0given. The value function for the saddlepoint problem, starting in any
period t,s a t i s ﬁes
˜ V ( ¯ Xt,Ξt−1) ≡ max
γt
min
(xt,it)
{˜ L( ¯ Xt,Ξt−1;xt,i t,γt)+δEt˜ V ( ¯ Xt+1,Ξt)},
14subject to (D.1) and (D.6).
Deﬁne
˜ Xt ≡
∙ ¯ Xt
Ξt−1
¸
, ˜ ıt ≡
⎡
⎣
xt
it
γt
⎤
⎦,
and deﬁne ¯ W, ˜ A, ˜ B,a n d ˜ C such that
˜ Lt ≡
1
2
∙ ˜ Xt
˜ ıt
¸0
¯ W
∙ ˜ Xt
˜ ıt
¸
, (D.7)
˜ Xt+1 = ˜ A ˜ Xt + ˜ B˜ ıt + ˜ C˜ εt+1. (D.8)
The problem (D.5) subject to (D.8) and given ˜ Xt is isomorphic to a standard backward-looking
linear-quadratic problem, except being a saddlepoint problem. However, the saddlepoint aspect
does not aﬀect the ﬁrst-order conditions. It is easy to show that the ﬁrst-order conditions of the
saddlepoint problem are identical to those of the original problem, (D.4) subject to (D.1) and (D.2).
The value function for the saddlepoint problem is quadratic,
˜ V ( ˜ Xt) ≡
1
2
( ˜ X0
t ˜ V ˜ Xt +˜ w),
where ˜ V solves the Riccati equation,
˜ V = Q + δ ˜ A0˜ V ˜ A − (δ ˜ B0˜ V ˜ A + N0)0(δ ˜ B0 ˜ V ˜ B + R)−1(δ ˜ B0˜ V ˜ A + N0),
where
¯ W ≡
∙
QN
N0 R
¸
,
is partitioned conformably with ˜ Xt and ˜ ıt.
The optimal reaction function for the saddlepoint problem is linear,
˜ ıt = F ˜ Xt ≡
⎡
⎣
Fx
Fi
Fγ
⎤
⎦ ˜ Xt,
where F is partitioned conformably with xt, it,a n dγt and satisﬁes
F ≡−(δ ˜ B0˜ V ˜ B + R)−1(δ ˜ B0 ˜ V ˜ A + N0).
This reaction function function is the optimal reaction function function for the original problem.
Optimization in a timeless perspective in period t corresponds to taking Ξt−1 from the previous
period’s decision problem as given, also in period 0.
15The equilibrium dynamics will be given by
˜ Xt+1 = M ˜ Xt + ˜ Cεt+1,
xt = Fx ˜ Xt,
it = Fi ˜ Xt,
Lt =
1
2
˜ X0
t ˜ W ˜ Xt,
where
M ≡ ˜ A + ˜ B ˜ F,
˜ W ≡
⎡
⎣
I 0
Fx
Fi
⎤
⎦
0
W0
⎡
⎣
I 0
Fx
Fi
⎤
⎦.
The value function for the saddlepoint problem can be decomposed according to
1
2
( ˜ X0
t ˜ V ˜ Xt +˜ w) ≡
1
2
( ˜ X0
tV ˜ Xt + w)+
1
2
( ˜ X0
tV 1 ˜ Xt + w1),
where
1
2
( ˜ X0
tV ˜ Xt + w) ≡ Et
∞ X
τ=0
δτ−t1
2
˜ X0
t+τ ˜ W ˜ Xt+τ,
is the value function for the original problem starting in period t with ˜ Xt ≡ (X0
t,Ξ0
t−1)0 given. The
matrix V will satisfy the Lyapunov equation,
V = ˜ W + δM0VM,
and, when δ<1, the constant w will satisfy
w =
δ
1 − δ
tr( ˜ C0V ˜ CΣ˜ ε˜ ε),
where Σ˜ ε˜ ε i st h ec o v a r i a n c em a t r i xf o r˜ εt.
E. An alternative ﬁnite-horizon numerical procedure for forward-looking models
In the ﬁnite-horizon model in section 3.1, there is an obvious alternative numerical procedure that
will provide a projection arbitrarily close to the optimal policy projection without requiring such a
long horizon that Xt+T,t and Ξt+T−1,t are close to their steady-state levels. It requires iterations,
though.
16Assume that iteration j−1 has resulted in Ξ
(j−1)
t+T−1,t. Start iteration j by using (2.17) and (2.18)
to replace (3.3) by
xt+T+1,t = FxM1
"
Xt+T,t
Ξ
(j−1)
t+T−1,t
#
,
where the matrices F1 and M1 are deﬁned by
F
⎡
⎣
Xt
0
Ξt−1
⎤
⎦ ≡ F1
∙
Xt
Ξt−1
¸
,M
⎡
⎣
Xt
0
Ξt−1
⎤
⎦ ≡ M1
∙
Xt
Ξt−1
¸
,
and F1 is partitioned conformably with xt and it as
F1 ≡
∙
Fx
Fi
¸
.
Consequently, replace (3.4) by
−A21Xt+T,t − A22xt+T,t − B2it+T,t + CFxM1
"
Xt+T,t
Ξ
(j−1)
t+T−1,t
#
=0 . (E.1)
Use (3.1), (3.2), and (E.1) to construct G and gt (the left submatrix of the matrix CFxM1 will
enter the last block of G and the product of the right submatrix and Ξ
(j−1)
t+T−1,t will enter the last
block of gt). Furthermore, add the term (3.7) with Ξt+T−1,t = Ξ
(j−1)
t+T−1,t to the loss function (that is,
modify the diagonal block of Ω that corresponds to Xt+T,t and add a linear term that corresponds
to the cross products of Xt+T,t and Ξ
(j−1)
t+T−1,t). Find the optimal policy projection ˆ st(j) and Lagrange
multiplier Λt(j) via the analogue of (3.12). This ends iteration j and results in Ξ
(j)
t+T−1,t.C o n t i n u e
until Ξ
(j)
t+T−1,t has converged.
Obviously this alternative procedure does not require that Xt+T,t and Ξt+T−1,t are close to
their steady-state levels. Which procedure is fastest will depend on the number of variables in the
problem and the rate of convergence towards the steady state of the optimal policy projection.
F. The feasible set of projections of the states of the economy, the feasible set of
projections of the target variables, and the optimal targeting rule
In the ﬁnite-horizon projection model in section 3.1, the feasible set of projections in period t of
the states of the economy, St,i st h es e to fp r o j e c t i o n sst that satisfy (3.5), repeated here as
Gst = gt. (F.1)
That is, St is the set of solutions to (F.1) for given G and gt.D e ﬁne n ≡ (T +1 ) ( nX + nx + ni),
m ≡ (T +1 ) ( nX + nx) <n ,a n dp ≡ (T +1 ) ni ≡ n − m.N o t et h a tG is m × n, st is n × 1,a n dgt
is m × 1. Assume that G is of rank m.
17Since G is of rank m, the set of solutions to (F.1) is a linear manifold of Rn of dimension
p ≡ n − m.41 It can be written as the set of projections st that satisfy
st = G+gt +( I − G+G)ξ (F.2)
for any ξ ∈ Rn (see Harville [A2, chapters 11 and 20]). Here, the n × m matrix G+ is the Moore-
Penrose inverse of G.W h e nG is m × n and of rank m, the Moore-Penrose inverse is given by
G+ = G0(GG0)−1
(note that GG0 is m × m,o fr a n km, and hence invertible). Then, G+G = G0(GG0)−1G is a
projection matrix that projects vectors in Rn on the m-dimensional column space of the n × m
matrix G0,t h et r a n s p o s eo fG.42 Denote the column space of G0 by C(G0). For any ξ in Rn,
the vector G+Gξ lies in C(G0).T h e nI − G+G is a projection matrix that projects vectors in Rn
oﬀ the column space of G0,t h a ti s ,o nt h ep-dimensional subspace of Rn orthogonal to C(G0),
the orthogonal complement of C(G0) (relative to Rn), denoted C⊥(G0). Hence, the solution set St
consist of C⊥(G0) shifted away from the origin by the vector G+gt,
St = {G+gt} + C⊥(G0).
Furthermore, the vector G+gt is the st o fm i n i m u mn o r mt h a ts a t i s ﬁes (F.1). Then, G+gt is
orthogonal to the solution set St and lies in the column space of G, C(G0).43
Figure F.1 provides an illustration of the above, when n =2and m = p =1 . The linear manifold
St, the set of feasible projections of the states of the economy, st, is shown as the negatively sloped
line through the point st = G+gt.T h e c o l u m n s p a c e C(G0) is the positively sloped line through
the origin. The linear manifold St is orthogonal to the column space. The orthogonal complement
of the column space, C⊥(G0), is the negatively sloped line through the origin. The linear manifold
is the orthogonal complement shifted away from the origin to the point G+gt. Furthermore, the
point G+gt is the point in the linear manifold with the shortest distance to the origin.
Let G⊥ denote a p×n matrix with p linearly independent rows, each of which is orthogonal to
the m rows of G.T h e nC⊥(G0)=C(G⊥0), where the latter expression denotes the column space of
41 Let V be a linear space. A subset S of V is a linear manifold of V (also called a linear variety of V ), if there is a
v in V such that the set S −{v} ≡ {s−v|s ∈ S} is a subspace of V . The dimension of S is the dimension of S −{v}.
Hence, a linear manifold is a subspace that has possibly been shifted away from the origin (in the above case by the
vector v).
42 In this section, the word “projection” is used not only to refer to mean forecasts but also, depending on the
context, to refer to mathematical projections in linear space.
43 A vector is orthogonal to a linear manifold if it is orthogonal to the corresponding subspace.
18Figure F.1: The set of feasible projections of the state of the economy, St
Rn
C(G' )
C (G' )
St
G+gt
0
st ^
⊥
Ωst+ωt–1
^
G⊥0,a n dSt can be written as the set of projections st that satisfy
st = G+gt + G⊥0ξ
for any ξ ∈ Rn.
The projection of the target variables, Y t, is a linear function of the projection of the states of
the economy according to (3.6), repeated here as
Y t = ˜ Dst. (F.3)
Let q ≡ (T +1)nY ≤ n,n o t et h a tY t is q ×1 and ˜ D is q ×n,a n dt a k e ˜ D to be of rank q.I tf o l l o w s
that the set of feasible projections of the target variables, Yt, consists of the set of projections Y t
that satisfy
Y t = ˜ DG+gt + ˜ DG⊥0ξ
for any ξ in Rn. This is a linear manifold of Rq of dimension at most min(p,q).I f I t a k e a s t h e
normal case that the number of target variables is at least as large as the number of instruments,
nY ≥ ni (typically, there are at least two target variables, inﬂation and the output gap, but only
one instrument, the instrument rate), I have q ≥ p, and the set of feasible projections of the target
variables, Yt, is a linear manifold of Rq of dimension at most p ≤ q.T h em a t r i x˜ D simply maps
the p-dimensional linear manifold St of Rn into the at most p-dimensional linear manifold Yt of Rq.
19Figure F.2: The set of feasible projections of the target variables, Yt
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It follows that Yt i st h ea tm o s tp-dimensional column space C( ˜ DG⊥0) in Rq shifted away from
the origin by the vector ˜ DG+gt,
Yt = { ˜ DG+gt} + C( ˜ DG⊥0).
Figure F.2 provides an illustration of the above, when q =2and p =1 . The linear manifold
Yt, the set of feasible projections of the target variables, Y t, is shown as the negatively sloped line
through the point Y t = ˜ DG+gt. The column space of the matrix ˜ DG⊥0, C( ˜ DG⊥0),i ss h o w na st h e
negative sloped line through the origin. The linear manifold Yt is this column space shifted away
from the origin to the point ˜ DG+gt.
F.1. An optimal targeting rule for the forward-looking model
Consider the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal policy under commitment in a timeless perspective
in the forward-looking model, (3.10), rewritten here as
Ωst + ωt−1 + G0Λt =0 (F.4)
The optimal targeting rule is the ﬁrst-order condition in terms of Y t when the Lagrange multiplier
has been eliminated.
L e tm ei n t e r p r e tt h eﬁrst-order condition in terms of st, eliminate the Lagrange multiplier, and
interpret the resulting targeting rule. Note that Ω is n×n, st and ωt−1 are n×1, G0 is n×m and
of rank m,a n dΛt is m × 1.
20Write the ﬁrst-order condition as
Ωst + ωt−1 = G0(−Λt). (F.5)
The term Ωst +ωt−1 on the left side is the gradient of the loss function with respect to st, a vector
in Rn. The condition (F.5) can be interpreted as stating that the gradient of the loss function is an
element of the m-dimensional column space of the n×m matrix G0, C(G0),w i t h−Λt providing the
coeﬃcients of the corresponding linear combination of the column vectors of G0. This is equivalent
to the tangency of the loss function’s iso-loss surface in Rn with the feasible set of projections,
St. The gradient of the loss function is orthogonal to the iso-loss surface. Tangency of the iso-loss
surface with St is then equivalent to the gradient being orthogonal to St. The subspace orthogonal
to St is C(G0), as noted above.
This is illustrated in ﬁgure F.1 when n =2and m = p =1 . The curve shows part of the iso-loss
surface of the loss function that is tangential to the linear manifold St. The tangency occurs at
the optimal policy projection, ˆ st. The gradient of the loss function at that point, Ωˆ st + ωt−1,i s
shown as the vector pointing northeast from that point. Tangency between the iso-loss surface and
the linear manifold is equivalent to the gradient being orthogonal to the linear manifold, or the
gradient being an element in the column space, C(G0).
In order to eliminate the Lagrange multipliers, premultiply (F.5) by G,44
G(Ωst + ωt−1)=GG0(−Λt). (F.6)
Exploit that GG0 is m × m,o fr a n km, and hence invertible, and solve for −Λt,
−Λt =( GG0)−1G(Ωst + ωt−1). (F.7)
(The matrix (GG0)−1G is actually the Moore-Penrose inverse of G0, G0+,w h e r eG0 is n × m with
rank m.) Substitution of Λt in (F.4) gives
M(Ωst + ωt−1)=0 , (F.8)
where M is the n × n matrix (not to be confused with the matrix denoted M in other sections of
this paper)
M ≡ I − G0(GG0)−1G = I − G+G.
44 One might ask why multipliying with the matrix G with rank m<nrather than a matrix with full rank n does
not loose any information of (F.5). More formally, let G
⊥ be a p × n matrix whose p rows are linearly independent
and orthogonal to the m rows of G. That is, the column space of G
⊥0 is the space in R
n orthogonal to the column
space of G
0.T h e nt h en×n matrix
k G
G
⊥
l
is of full rank. Multiplying (F.5) by this matrix leads to the m equations
of (F.6) and p additional trivial equations of zero equals zero, since we know that the left and right sides of (F.5) lie
in the column space of G
0.
21As noted above, M is the projection matrix that projects vectors in Rn on the p-dimensional
orthogonal complement of the column space of G0, C⊥(G0). Hence, (F.8) states that the projection
on C⊥(G0) of the gradient of the loss function is zero. Of course, this follows directly from the
observation above that the gradient lies in C(G0).
In any case, the optimal targeting rule in terms of st is equivalent to the statement that the
gradient is orthogonal to the feasible set of projections of the states of the economy, St,w h i c hc a n
be expressed algebraically as (F.8).
However, (F.8) involves n equations, but only p independent equations. It is hence desirable to
condense (F.8) to only p equations. The projection matrix M is a symmetric idempotent matrix of
rank p. Then its spectrum consists of p eigenvalues equal to one and m eigenvalues equal to zero,
and it can be decomposed as
M = Q
∙
Ip 0
00
¸
Q0 ≡
£
Qp Qm
¤∙
Ip 0
00
¸∙
Q0
p
Q0
m
¸
≡ QpQ0
p.
Here Q is the orthonormal n × n matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors of M, Ip is the p × p
identity matrix, and Qp is the n×p matrix whose columns are the p eigenvectors corresponding to
the p nonzero eigenvalues. Then, pre-multiplying (F.8) by Q0 gives the p nontrivial equations,
Q0
p(Ωst + ωt−1)=0 , (F.9)
and m trivial equations of zero equals zero.
Furthermore, (F.9) is expressed in terms of the projection of the states of the economy, st.I n
order to express it in terms of the projection of the target variables, Y t, note that, by the deﬁnition
of Ω for the forward-looking model in section 3.1,
Ωst ≡ ˜ D0 ˜ W ˜ Dst ≡ ˜ D0 ˜ WYt,
where ˜ W is a symmetric positive semideﬁnite block-diagonal (T +1)nY matrix with the (τ +1)-th
diagonal block being δτW for 0 ≤ τ ≤ T. Hence, I can write (F.9) as involving only the target
variables and, through the vector ωt−1, the Lagrange multiplier Ξt−1,t−1 from the optimization in
period t − 1,
Q0
p[ ˜ D0 ˜ WYt + ωt−1]=0 . (F.10)
This is one concise form of the targeting rule. The history-dependence of the optimal policy
under commitment in a timeless perspective enters via Ξt−1,t−1.
22By combining (F.9) with (3.5), I get
∙
G
Q0
pΩ
¸
st =
∙
gt
−Q0
pωt−1
¸
,
and
ˆ st =
∙
G
Q0
pΩ
¸−1 ∙
gt
−Q0
pωt−1
¸
≡ H
⎡
⎣
Xt
Ξt−1,t−1
zt
⎤
⎦, (F.11)
ˆ Y t = ˜ Dˆ st = ˜ DH
⎡
⎣
Xt
Ξt−1,t−1
zt
⎤
⎦.
From (F.7) and (F.11), I can extract
Ξt,t = HΞ
⎡
⎣
Xt
Ξt−1,t−1
zt
⎤
⎦,
to be used in the intertemporal loss function for the decision problem in period t +1 .
If the forward-looking variables, xt, are target variables–elements of Yt–the intertemporal loss
function with the added term can be written
1
2
Y t0 ˜ WYt + w0
t−1Y t,
where wt−1 is a q-vector whose only nonzero elements contain the vector (Ξt−1,t−1
1
δC)0 such that
w0
t−1Y t ≡ Ξt−1,t−1
1
δCxt,t. Then, the optimal targeting rule can be expressed as the gradient,
˜ WYt + wt−1, being orthogonal to the linear manifold Yt. Suppose Yt is of dimension p,a n dl e t
F ≡ ˜ DG⊥0 (not to be confused with the matrix denoted F in other sections of the paper). The
projection matrix that projects vectors in Rq on the p-dimensional subspace Yt −{ ˜ DG+gt} is then
F(F0F)−1F0, so the condition that the gradient is orthogonal to the linear manifold Yt can be
written as the p equations.
F(F0F)−1F0 ˜ W(ΩY t + wt−1)=0 .
This is the optimal targeting rule for this case.
This case is illustrated in ﬁgure F.2. The curve in the ﬁgure shows a part of the iso-loss surface
of the loss function that is tangential to the linear manifold Yt. The tangency point is the optimal
policy projection of the target variables, ˆ Y t. The gradient of the loss function at that point,
˜ W ˆ Y t + wt−1, is shown as the vector at that point that points northeast. It is orthogonal to the
linear manifold.
Svensson [25] interprets optimal targeting rules in terms of the equality between the marginal
rates of transformation and marginal rates of substitution between the target variables. A vector
23of marginal rates of transformation between the target variables is a vector in the column space
C( ˜ DG⊥0), the subspace associated with Yt. A vector of marginal rates of substitution between the
target variables is a vector in the tangent space of the intertemporal loss function, the subspace
orthogonal to the gradient of the loss function. Equality between the marginal rates of transfor-
mation and substitution is equivalent to the gradient being orthogonal to Yt,t h a ti s ,t h ei s o - l o s s
surface being tangential to Yt.
G. An optimal restricted instrument rule
Add to the model (2.1) an explicit instrument rules of the form
it = fXXt, (G.1)
where the ni×nX matrix fX is restricted to be an element fX ∈ F of a given class F of instrument
rules. Assume that the deviation zt is an iid zero-mean process with variance-covariance matrix Σ.
Let the loss function in period t be
lim
δ→1
Et
∞ X
τ=0
(1 − δ)δτLt+τ =E [ Lt],
where Lt is given by (2.7). By appendix A, for a given instrument rule fX, the conditional loss in
period t is, for a given δ (0 <δ<1), given by
Et
∞ X
τ=0
(1 − δ)δτLt+τ =
1
2
{(1 − δ)X0
tV (fX,δ)Xt + δtrace[V (fX,δ)Σ]},
where V (fX,δ) is a symmetric positive semideﬁnite nX ×nX matrix that depends on A, B, C, D,
W, fX,a n dδ. It follows that
E[Lt]=
1
2
trace[V (fX,1)Σ].
The optimal restricted instrument rule, ˆ fX,i st h e ng i v e nb y
ˆ fX =a r gm i n
fX∈F
1
2
trace[V (fX,1)Σ].
It depends on the class F and the variance-covariance matrix Σ, in addition to A, B, C, D,a n d
W.
Note that there is little point in considering implicit instrument rules here,
it = fXXt + fxxt. (G.2)
24For any such implicit instrument rule f ≡ [fX fx] for which a unique equilibrium exists,
xt = g(f)Xt,
where the matrix g(f) depends on f. Then,
it =[ fX + fxg(f)]Xt ≡ ˜ fX(f)Xt.
That is, for each implicit instrument rule f for which there is a unique equilibrium, there is a
unique explicit instrument rule ˜ fX(f) consistent with that equilibrium. Furthermore, for any
explicit instrument rule fX in (G.1) for which there is a unique equilibrium, there is a continuum
of implicit instrument rules consistent with that equilibrium. For any given instrument rule fX for
which there exists a unique equilibrium,xt = g(fX)Xt,w h e r et h em a t r i xg(fX) depends on fX.F o r
any arbitrary ni × nx matrix fx,Ic a nt h e nw r i t e
it = fXXt + fx[xt − g(fX)Xt]=[ fX − fxg(fX)]Xt + fxxt ≡ ˜ fX(fX,f x)Xt + fxxt.
The only reason for considering implicit instrument rules rather than an explicit instrument rule in
this context (when the deviation is an iid zero-mean shock) is when an explicit instrument rule has a
determinacy problem–multiple equilibria–in which case one may be able to ﬁnd a corresponding
implicit instrument rule for which there is a unique equilibrium. Svensson and Woodford [30]
examine such issues further.
H. An empirical backward-looking model
The two equations of the model of Rudebusch and Svensson [18] are
πt+1 = απ1πt + απ2πt−1 + απ3πt−2 + απ4πt−3 + αyyt + zπ,t+1 (H.1)
yt+1 = βy1yt + βy2yt−1 − βr
µ
1
4
Σ3
j=0it−j −
1
4
Σ3
j=0πt−j
¶
+ zy,t+1, (H.2)
where πt is quarterly inﬂation in the GDP chain-weighted price index (pt) in percentage points at
an annual rate, i.e., 400(lnp − lnpt−1); it is the quarterly average federal funds rate in percentage
points at an annual rate; yt is the relative gap between actual real GDP (qt) and potential GDP (q∗
t)
in percentage points, i.e., 100(qt −q∗
t)/q∗
t.T h e s eﬁve variables were de-meaned prior to estimation,
so no constants appear in the equations.
The estimated parameters, using the sample period 1961:1 to 1996:2, are shown in table H.1.
25Table H.1
απ1 απ2 απ3 απ4 αy βy1 βy2 βr
0.70
(0.08)
−0.10
(0.10)
0.28
(0.10)
0.12
(0.08)
0.14
(0.03)
1.16
(0.08)
−0.25
(0.08)
0.10
(0.03)
The hypothesis that the sum of the lag coeﬃcients of inﬂation equals one has a p-value of .16, so
this restriction was imposed in the estimation.45
The state-space form can be written
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
πt+1
πt
πt−1
πt−2
yt+1
yt
it
it−1
it−2
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
=
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎣
P4
j=1 απjej + αye5
e1
e2
e3
βre1:4 + βy1e5 + βy2e6 − βre7:9
e5
e0
e7
e8
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎥
⎦
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
πt
πt−1
πt−2
πt−3
yt
yt−1
it−1
it−2
it−3
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
+
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎣
0
0
0
0
−
βr
4
0
1
0
0
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎥
⎦
it +
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
zπ,t+1
0
0
0
zy,t+1
0
0
0
0
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
,
where ej (j =0 ,1,...,9) denotes a 1×9 row vector, for j =0w i t ha l le l e m e n t se q u a lt oz e r o ,f o r
j =1 ,...,9 with element j equal to unity and all other elements equal to zero; and where ej:k
(j<k ) denotes a 1×9 row vector with elements j,j +1 ,...,k equal to 1
4 and all other elements
equal to zero. The predetermined variables are πt, πt−1, πt−2, πt−3, yt, yt−1, it−1, it−2, it−2,a n d
it−3. There are no forward-looking variables.
For a loss function (5.3) with δ =1 , λ =1 ,a n dν =0 .2,a n dt h ec a s ew h e r ezt is an iid zero-
mean shock; the optimal reaction function (2.21) is (the coeﬃcients are rounded to two decimal
points),
it =1 .22πt +0.43πt−1 +0.53πt−2 +0.18πt−3 +1.93yt −0.49yt−1 +0.36it−1 −0.09it−2 −0.05it−3.
I. An empirical forward-looking model
An empirical New Keynesian model estimated by Lindé [13] is
πt = ωfπt+1|t +( 1− ωf)πt−1 + γyt + zπt,
yt = βfyt+1|t +( 1− βf)(βy1yt−1 + βy2yt−2 + βy3yt−3 + βy4yt−4) − βr(it − πt+1|t)+zyt,
where the restriction
P4
j=1 βyj =1is imposed. The estimated coeﬃcients are (Table 6a in Lindé
[13], non-farm business output) are shown in table I.1.
45 This p-value was obtained by simulating the above inﬂation equation 1000 times and ranking the sum of
coeﬃcients from the unrestricted Phillips curve estimated from the actual data (i.e., 0.969) in the set of unrestricted
sums estimated from the simulated data. This is in the spirit of Rudebusch [A5]. For comparison, the simple t-test
gives a p-value of 0.42.
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ωf γβ f βr βy1 βy2 βy3
0.457
(0.065)
0.048
(0.007)
0.425
(0.027)
0.156
(0.016)
1.310
(0.174)
−0.229
(0.279)
−0.011
(0.037)
For simplicity, I set βy1 =1 , βy2 = βy3 = βy4 =0 . Then the state-space form can be written as
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
πt
yt
it
zπ,t+1
zy,t+1
ωfπt+1|t
βrπt+1|t + βfyt+1|t
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
=
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
0 0 00 010
0 0 00 001
0 0 00 000
0 0 00 000
0 0 00 000
−(1 − ωf)00 −101 −γ
0 −(1 − βf)0 0 −10 1
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
πt−1
yt−1
it−1
zπt
zyt
πt
yt
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
+
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
0
0
1
0
0
0
βr
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
it +
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
0
0
0
zπ,t+1
zy,t+1
0
0
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
.
The predetermined variables are πt−1, yt−1, it−1, zπt,a n dzyt, and the forward-looking variables
are πt and yt.
For a loss function (5.3) with δ =1 , λ =1 ,a n dν =0 .2,a n dt h ec a s ew h e r ezt is an iid zero-
mean shock; the optimal reaction function (2.21) is (the coeﬃcients are rounded to two decimal
points),
it =0 .58πt−1 +0 .80yt−1 +0 .41it−1 +1 .06zπt +1 .38zyt +0 .02Ξπ,t−1,t−1 +0 .20Ξy,t−1,t−1,
where Ξπ,t−1,t−1 and Ξy,t−1,t−1 are the Lagrange multipliers for the two equations for the forward-
looking variables in the decision problem in period t − 1.
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